Campbell Soup Company

CPB
Financial Analysis · Updated May 28, 2026 · Coverage 2026-Q2
Latest Q Revenue
$2.6B
Q2 FY26 · -5% YoY
Margin Profile
Gross 30.5%
Operating 14.5%
FCF 6.9%
FY25
Diluted Shares
300M
FY25 · +0% (dilution)

Business Overview


ticker: CPB source: coverage-next-full step: 01 coverage_date: 2026-05-28

CPB — Step 01: Business Model & Overview

Key Findings

The Campbell's Company is a brand-owner + manufacturer + distributor of US center-store packaged food, with two reportable segments and 16 leadership brands [S1]. The business model is mature, generates predictable cash flow ($1.1B+ OCF annually [S2]), and depends on three economic engines: (1) brand pricing power in mature categories (soup ~58% share, premium pasta sauce via Rao's) [S3]; (2) scale economics in procurement and manufacturing (~30 plants, 14,500 employees) [S6]; and (3) shelf and DSD distribution advantage at major retailers (Walmart ~22% of sales) [S6]. Net positive for stability, net mixed for growth — most leadership brands are in flat-to-declining categories, with growth concentrated in Rao's and a small set of premium SKUs.

Implications for Thesis and Valuation

  • Predictable cash-generative business suitable for a DCF + dividend yield lens. Steady-state FCF $700–900M base case.
  • Limited organic growth (low-single-digit at best) means valuation expansion has to come from re-rating, not earnings explosion.
  • Walmart concentration is the single most important channel risk — any shift in shelf allocation or private-label expansion could pressure 10–20% of revenue.
  • Brand portfolio is bimodal — a few iconic brands ($1B+) with durable moats, and a long tail of legacy SKUs (V8, Pace, SpaghettiOs, Lance) in slow decline.

Objective

Map CPB's revenue model, segment structure, brand portfolio, customer/channel mix, and value-chain position to set the analytical frame for Steps 02–18.

Narrative Analysis

What CPB Sells

Two segments, restated as of FY2026 to move Latin America retail snacking from Snacks to Meals & Beverages [S5]:

Meals & Beverages (FY25: $6.05B, 59% of revenue):

  • Soup: Campbell's condensed + ready-to-serve, Chunky, Pacific Foods broth — foundational category, ~58% US share for CPB [S3]
  • Pasta sauce: Prego (mid-tier) + Rao's (premium, acquired March 2024 via Sovos) [S6]
  • Other meals: Pace Mexican sauces, SpaghettiOs, Swanson canned poultry [S6]
  • Beverages: V8 juices, Campbell's tomato juice — long-tail category in slow decline [S3]
  • Frozen: Rao's frozen entrées + frozen pizza, Michael Angelo's frozen Italian (Sovos-acquired) [S6]

Snacks (FY25: $4.20B, 41% of revenue):

  • Pepperidge Farm: cookies (Milano, Goldfish), crackers, fresh bakery, frozen pastries [S6]
  • Goldfish crackers: largest standalone brand in Snacks [S6]
  • Snyder's of Hanover pretzels (acquired 2018 via Snyder's-Lance) [S6]
  • Lance sandwich crackers, Cape Cod potato chips, Kettle Brand potato chips [S6]
  • Late July organic snacks, Snack Factory pretzel crisps [S6]
  • Pop Secret popcorn divested Aug 2024 [S2]
Leadership Brand Concentration
Brand Approx FY25 revenue Category Trend
Campbell's (soup) ~$2.5B+ Soup Slow decline -2 to -4%/yr secularly [S3]
Goldfish ~$1.3B+ Cracker snacks Flattening after multi-year growth [S3]
Pepperidge Farm ~$1.5B+ Cookies + bakery Mixed; Milano resilient [S3]
Rao's ~$900M (approaching $1B) Premium pasta sauce + frozen Growing high-single to low-double-digit [S2][S6]
Snyder's of Hanover ~$700M Pretzels -5% to -10% YoY in tracked channels [S2]
Lance ~$400M Sandwich crackers Declining [S2]
Cape Cod + Kettle Brand ~$500M combined Premium chips Mixed [S3]
Swanson + Pacific Foods + Chunky + Prego + V8 + Pace + Late July + Snack Factory ~$2.4B aggregate Various Mostly flat/slow decline [S3]

Three $1B+ brands (Campbell's, Goldfish, Pepperidge Farm) + Rao's approaching $1B = ~$6B+ revenue concentration in 4 brands (~58% of total).

Value-Chain Position

CPB occupies the brand owner + manufacturer + DSD/warehouse distributor layer of the food value chain:

Layer Role CPB ownership
Raw materials (wheat, tomato, dairy, aluminum) Sourced from commodity markets / contract farmers No (supply risk)
Co-packing / contract manufacturing Limited (~10–15% of volume) Partial
Owned manufacturing ~30 plants across US + Italy (Rao's pasta sauce) Yes (primary)
Brand IP + product development Owned; A&P spend 9–10% of sales Yes
Direct-store-delivery (DSD) Pepperidge Farm + Snyder's-Lance use DSD; rest is warehouse Yes for snacks DSD
Retail shelf Negotiated with WMT, COST, KR, AMZN, others Sells in
Consumer Households (no D2C) Indirect

The DSD network (inherited from Snyder's-Lance 2018) is a real moat for Snacks — it locks in shelf presence + freshness control + retail relationships, hard to replicate.

Channel Mix
Channel Approx % Notes
Walmart + Sam's Club ~22% Largest single customer [S6]
Costco ~8–10% (est.) Premium tier + Rao's strong here
Kroger ~7–10% (est.) Mainstream supermarket
Amazon (digital) ~3–5% (est.) Growing
Other supermarket / club / mass ~40% Albertsons, Publix, Target, etc.
Foodservice (Pacific, Lance, broth) ~10–12% Long-tail B2B
International (Canada + Latin Am) ~5–8% Small but growing in Latin Am
Why CPB Renamed in Nov 2024

The "Campbell Soup Company" name underweighted the now-41%-of-revenue Snacks business plus Rao's premium pasta sauce. "The Campbell's Company" positions the portfolio as a brand house rather than a soup specialist [S6]. Symbolically signals that the snacks acquisition strategy (Snyder's-Lance 2018, Sovos 2024) is the go-forward identity.

Evidence and Sources

See Source Index. Key facts cross-confirmed across XBRL summary, Q4 FY25 earnings release, 10-K business section, and industry coverage.

Assumption Register Updates

  • (No new assumptions this step; A4 Walmart 22% concentration already entered in Step 00)

Tables and Calculations

See Leadership Brand Concentration table above.

Open Questions and Data Gaps

  1. Exact Rao's quarterly revenue not disclosed — only "approaching $1B" framing
  2. DSD network economics (truck count, route density, route productivity vs Frito-Lay) not in public disclosures
  3. Walmart relationship terms (joint business plans, slotting fees) not public
  4. Foodservice subsegment growth and margins not separately disclosed

Next-Step Dependencies

  • Step 02 (Industry) inherits brand → category mapping
  • Step 03 (Revenue Architecture) decomposes the $10.3B into growth drivers
  • Step 07 (Capital Allocation) uses Snyder's-Lance + Sovos acquisitions for the M&A scorecard
  • Step 10 (Moat) uses brand + DSD + scale framing here

Source Index

Tag Document Path Notes
[S1] SEC XBRL companyfacts API + FY25 10-K CPB_financials/xbrl/xbrl_summary.md Segment revenue + structure
[S2] Q4 FY25 press release (Ex 99.1, 8-K filed 2025-09-03) CPB_financials/sec_filings/10K_FY2025_summary.md Segment results + brand commentary
[S3] Industry overview research CPB_financials/industry/market_overview.md Category share + dynamics
[S4] Q2 FY26 press release + consensus CPB_financials/other/consensus.md Updated guidance
[S5] Segment recast 8-K (filed 2025-12-09) sec_filings/filing_inventory.md FY26 segment realignment
[S6] FY25 10-K summary CPB_financials/sec_filings/10K_FY2025_summary.md Brand list + Walmart concentration + M&A history

Financial Snapshot


ticker: CPB source: coverage-next-full step: 04 coverage_date: 2026-05-28

CPB — Step 04: Financial Quality & Adversarial Sweep

Key Findings

CPB's financial quality is mediocre but not impaired. The gap between GAAP EPS ($2.01 FY25) and adjusted EPS ($2.97 FY25) is wide — $0.96/share of add-backs, of which the largest items are non-cash impairment ($0.44), cost-savings/optimization opex ($0.32), and divestiture charges ($0.11) [S1]. These are accounting-noisy but mostly legitimate (PPA-driven non-cash + integration costs that will eventually anniversary). Cash flow quality is acceptable: OCF $1.13B converts to FCF $705M (5% of revenue), with $145M of PEAK savings already in the run-rate [S1][S2]. The adversarial sweep finds no smoking-gun short report, no SEC investigation, and no major accounting restatement — but does surface (1) PFAS litigation overhang in soup/broth cans, (2) labeling lawsuits (typical CPG nuisance), (3) historical FY24 cybersecurity incident referenced in non-GAAP reconciliation [S1], and (4) the question of whether Sovos/Rao's goodwill ($1.1B+ allocated) is at risk of impairment if premium frozen growth disappoints.

Implications for Thesis and Valuation

  • Use adjusted EPS for valuation lens but recognize $0.20–$0.30 of adjustments will be recurring through FY27 (integration + PEAK opex)
  • Watch goodwill ($4.99B) + other intangibles ($4.34B) = $9.3B — 61% of total assets. Even a 10% Sovos goodwill impairment would be a $300M+ non-cash hit
  • No quality red flags requiring investigation discount — straightforward CPG accounting
  • FCF coverage of dividend tight (1.5x) — financial flexibility limited

Objective

Score financial-statement quality, reconcile GAAP-to-adjusted gap, conduct the adversarial research sweep, and flag any quality issues that should adjust valuation.

Narrative Analysis

Adjusted-to-GAAP Reconciliation (FY25)
Item $/share $M (approx) Quality assessment
GAAP diluted EPS $2.01 $602 NI Reported
Cost savings + optimization opex $0.32 $96 Recurring during integration; will anniversary by FY28
Commodity MTM (gains)/losses -$0.03 -$9 Non-cash; appropriate to exclude
Accelerated amortization $0.05 $15 Non-cash; PPA-driven
Divestiture charges $0.11 $33 Non-recurring; noosa + Pop Secret
Litigation expenses $0.02 $6 Nuisance; recurring at low level
Impairment charges $0.44 $132 Non-cash; PPA-driven (Sovos)
Pension actuarial losses $0.06 $18 Non-cash; rate-driven
Adjusted EPS $2.97 $892 Used for valuation

[S1]

Quality of Earnings — Cash Conversion
FY Net Income (GAAP) OCF OCF / NI FCF FCF / Adj NI
FY22 757 1,181 156% 939 86%
FY23 858 1,143 133% 773 65% (capex spike)
FY24 567 1,185 209% 668 65% (Sovos drag)
FY25 602 1,131 188% 705 79%

Source: SEC XBRL [S2]. OCF/NI >100% reflects D&A + non-cash add-backs (typical for mature CPG with heavy intangibles).

Read: Cash conversion is solid; the GAAP NI is depressed by non-cash items (D&A on PPA intangibles, impairments). FCF / Adj NI of ~80% is normal for a CPG with 4–5% capex intensity.

Working Capital Quality
  • DSO: ~30 days (typical CPG; mostly large retail customer credit)
  • DIO: ~50 days (typical; some seasonality in soup ahead of winter)
  • DPO: ~45 days
  • Cash conversion cycle: ~35 days — stable, no degradation

(Not extracted line-by-line in this run; derived from quarterly balance-sheet ratios.)

Goodwill + Intangibles Concentration
Item Q2 FY26 % of Assets
Total assets $15,348M 100%
Goodwill $4,992M 32.5%
Other intangibles (mostly indefinite-lived trade names) $4,335M 28.2%
Combined intangibles $9,327M 60.7%

[S2]

Concentration risk: A 10% impairment on goodwill or indefinite intangibles would be a $500M+ non-cash hit ($1.67/share) — material on a $20 stock. Most likely impairment candidates: Sovos goodwill (~$1.1B PPA bump from $2.7B deal less ~$1.7B intangibles) and Snyder's-Lance legacy goodwill if Snacks margins continue to compress.

Adversarial Research Sweep

Short Reports / Activist Targets
  • No active short report identified via web search (Citron, Hindenburg, Spruce Point, etc.) [S3]
  • Short interest: moderate (~5–7% of float typical for a distressed staples name; not a heavily shorted name)
  • No active activist campaign. Third Point made noise in 2018; nothing material since.
SEC Investigations / Enforcement
  • No active SEC investigation identified.
  • Historical: standard FCPA monitoring at Sovos pre-acquisition; integrated into CPB compliance.
Litigation
  • PFAS lawsuits — packaged-food companies including CPB face class actions related to packaging materials (soup cans, Rao's jars). Status: early-stage, no material accrual disclosed.
  • Labeling lawsuits — periodic (vegetable juice "fresh" labeling, organic claims). Standard CPG nuisance — captured in $6M FY25 "litigation expenses" add-back.
  • Cybersecurity incident — FY24 cyber incident referenced in non-GAAP reconciliation; appears resolved with no material data loss or ransom.
Accounting Red Flags
  • No restatements in last 10 years (per SEC EDGAR review).
  • No 10-K/A amendments of substance.
  • Internal control material weaknesses: none disclosed in FY25 10-K.
  • Auditor: PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (long-tenured); no auditor changes recently.
Segment-Reporting Restatement (FY26)

Beginning FY26, the Latin America snacking/M&B retail business moved from Snacks to Meals & Beverages segment [S4]. This is a clean restatement (recast filed Dec 9, 2025 8-K with full historical data) — not a red flag, but worth noting because it slightly improves the optical Snacks margin in restated history (removed some weaker LatAm volume).

Auditor + Audit Committee
  • Auditor: PwC
  • Audit committee chair: long-tenured independent director (per proxy)
  • No going-concern flag; no critical audit matters of unusual concern
Compensation-Driven Earnings Manipulation Risk
  • PSU vesting tied to 3-year adj EPS + relative TSR — could incentivize aggressive adjustments
  • BUT historical add-backs have been consistent + auditor-reviewed
  • The $0.44 FY25 impairment add-back is the largest single item — it relates to a noosa-related goodwill write-down (divested), not strategic FY25 EPS engineering

Evidence and Sources

Negative Quality Signals
Signal Severity Status
Wide GAAP-to-adj EPS gap ($0.96/share) Medium Largely non-cash + integration; will narrow
High intangibles concentration ($9.3B) Medium Watchpoint for future impairment
FCF coverage of dividend (1.5x) Medium Tight; not impaired
Long-term inflation in net debt ($4B → $7B) High Sovos-driven; deleveraging path slow
Repeated cost-savings opex add-backs Low-Medium Recurring but legitimate
Positive Quality Signals
Signal Comment
OCF / NI >150% multi-year Strong cash conversion
No SEC investigations, restatements, or material weaknesses Clean control environment
Long-tenured Big 4 auditor (PwC) Audit continuity
40+ year dividend record (uninterrupted) Capital return discipline
Family-trust ownership (Dorrance) limits short-term earnings games Long-term orientation

Assumption Register Updates

  • No new assumptions; quality assessment supports existing A14 WACC at 6.5–7%

Tables and Calculations

See Adjusted-to-GAAP Reconciliation + Goodwill/Intangibles Concentration tables.

Open Questions and Data Gaps

  1. PFAS litigation accrual amount (if any) not disclosed
  2. Goodwill impairment testing assumptions for Sovos / Snyder's-Lance not in MD&A detail
  3. Cybersecurity incident cost not separately quantified (rolled into reconciliation)
  4. Tax position on Italian Rao's manufacturing (transfer pricing) not addressed

Next-Step Dependencies

  • Step 06 (Balance Sheet) deepens debt + share count detail
  • Step 11 (External Risk) revisits PFAS + tariff + commodity
  • /complete-coverage Step 14 (Valuation) uses adjusted EPS framework set here

Source Index

Tag Document Path Notes
[S1] Q4 FY25 release adj reconciliation sec_filings/10K_FY2025_summary.md + other/consensus.md EPS bridge detail
[S2] SEC XBRL xbrl/xbrl_summary.md OCF + NI + Balance Sheet history
[S3] Web search (no short report identified) (negative result) Adversarial sweep
[S4] Segment recast 8-K (Dec 9, 2025) sec_filings/filing_inventory.md FY26 segment restatement

Deeper Financial Analysis

The fundamental tier adds 9 additional research dimensions for $CPB.

Revenue Breakdown
Segment revenue, geographic mix, product-line contribution margins, and cohort dynamics.
Financial Trends
Quarter-over-quarter momentum, leading indicators, and inflection point analysis.
Balance Sheet
Debt structure, liquidity runway, dilution risk, and working capital dynamics.
Capital Allocation
Buyback cadence, M&A appetite, dividend policy, and reinvestment priorities.
Returns on Capital (ROIC)
Multi-year ROIC vs. WACC, marginal returns on reinvestment, sales-to-invested-capital efficiency, and moat spread.
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