# AECOM (ACM) — Financial Analysis

**Exchange:**   
**Coverage as of:** 2026-Q2  
**Updated:** 2026-06-10  
**Tier:** Free primer (step 2 of 19)  
**Sibling pages:** /stocks/ACM/thesis · /stocks/ACM/memo

## Financial Snapshot

---
source: coverage-next-full
ticker: ACM
step: 04
title: Financial Quality & Adversarial Research Sweep
created: 2026-06-08
---

### Step 04: Financial Quality & Adversarial Research Sweep — AECOM (ACM)

---

#### 1. Income Statement Quality

##### GAAP vs. Adjusted Reconciliation

AECOM's headline metric is Adjusted EBITDA (on a Net Service Revenue basis), which is the number management emphasizes and analysts primarily use to value the business. The gap between GAAP and adjusted figures is material and requires careful unpacking.

**FY2023 — The Widest Gap:**

| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| GAAP EPS (diluted) | $0.39 | $2.95 | $4.21 |
| Adj. EPS (mgmt.) | ~$3.83 | $4.63 | $5.26 |
| GAAP–Adj. gap | $(3.44) | $(1.68) | $(1.05) |
| GAAP Operating Income | $324M | $827M | $1,027M |
| Adj. EBITDA (NSR basis) | ~$985M | ~$1,090M | $1,203M |

**FY2023 primary adjusters:**

1. **AECOM Capital (ACAP) equity losses:** $279.4M impairment-driven equity losses from real estate JVs — recorded within operating income as "Equity in earnings (losses) of unconsolidated joint ventures" [S1]. Management appropriately excludes these in adjusted metrics because ACAP was a non-core, winding-down capital unit.

2. **Restructuring charges:** $188.4M in FY2023 (vs. $98.9M in FY2024) — these are recurring in AECOM's history but have been elevated for several consecutive years [S1]. Restructuring has appeared in every fiscal year shown (FY2020–FY2024 all carry restructuring lines). The persistence of "non-recurring" restructuring is a moderate quality concern. Over FY2020–FY2024, AECOM booked cumulative restructuring charges of approximately $635M+, which is difficult to call purely episodic.

3. **Discontinued operations losses:** FY2024 included $(105.0)M from discontinued operations, primarily revision to estimated contingent consideration from the civil infrastructure sale [S1]. These drag GAAP but are legitimately excluded from continuing-operations adjusted metrics.

4. **Amortization of acquired intangibles:** included within GAAP COGS/SG&A but added back in Adjusted EBITDA calculations. With ~$3.5B+ goodwill on the balance sheet and associated customer relationship / backlog amortization, this add-back is economically meaningful.

**Assessment — Is the GAAP-Adjusted Gap Appropriate?**

The bulk of the FY2023 gap is defensible: ACAP was genuinely non-core and was being exited; the impairment was triggered by objective real estate market deterioration, not earnings management. The FY2024 and FY2025 gaps are narrower as ACAP exits the picture.

The more persistent concern is **restructuring normalization**. AECOM has booked $48M–$188M in restructuring annually since FY2020, suggesting this is structural overhead, not genuinely one-time. A conservative analyst should model ~$80–100M of "normalized" annual restructuring rather than excluding it entirely. At the FY2025 adjusted EPS of $5.26, adding back $75M of normalized restructuring after-tax (~$57M or ~$0.43/share) reduces "clean" EPS to approximately $4.83.

##### Revenue Recognition Risk

AECOM recognizes revenue under ASC 606 using the cost-to-cost input method for professional services (percentage-of-completion equivalent). Key risks:

- **Unbilled receivables (contract assets):** These represent work performed but not yet billed, and are a standard feature of engineering/construction firms. Rising unbilled balances can indicate revenue recognition ahead of cash collection or disputed work.
- **Fixed-price contract exposure:** The 10-K discloses material exposure to fixed-price contracts, where cost-overrun risk is borne by AECOM [S1]. Gross margin performance on this subset is not separately disclosed.
- **Claims:** The Q2 FY2026 10-Q disclosed approximately $680M in significant claims recorded in contract assets and other non-current assets as of March 31, 2026, up from approximately $400M at September 30, 2025 [S2]. This $280M increase in disputed/contested receivables within a single quarter is a red flag and is discussed further in Sections 2, 3, and 5.

---

#### 2. Balance Sheet Quality

##### Goodwill and Intangibles

| Period | Goodwill ($M) | Total Assets ($M) | Goodwill/Total Assets |
|--------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| Sep 2023 | ~$3,447 | $11,233 | 30.7% |
| Sep 2024 | $3,480 | $12,062 | 28.8% |
| Sep 2025 | $3,701 | $12,200 | 30.3% |
| Mar 2026 | $3,762 | $12,007 | 31.3% |

Goodwill of $3.7–3.8B represents approximately 31% of total assets — elevated but not unusual for a professional services firm built through acquisitions [S3]. The primary source is the 2014 merger with URS Corporation ($4.2B transaction), as well as earlier acquisitions (Earth Tech, DMJM, Ellerbe Becket). The goodwill balance has been broadly stable since 2023, with the ~$220M step-up in FY2025 reflecting the Cofely Services acquisition [S3].

**Impairment risk:** AECOM performs its annual goodwill impairment test in Q1 each fiscal year. With an implied enterprise value of approximately $11B and goodwill of $3.7B, the "cushion" between fair value and carrying value warrants monitoring, particularly if the securities fraud investigations (see Section 5) and claims receivable issues compress earnings.

Beyond goodwill, AECOM carries acquired intangibles (primarily customer relationships and backlog) that are amortized over time. XBRL data does not separately break out intangibles amortization; the D&A line of $175–179M in FY2023–FY2024 includes this component [S3].

##### Working Capital and Receivables

**Days Sales Outstanding (DSO):** Per the FY2024 10-K, DSO was 70 days in FY2024 vs. 65 days in FY2023 — a 5-day deterioration [S1]. For a professional services firm with government-client concentration, 65–70 days DSO is acceptable but trending in the wrong direction.

**Contract assets (unbilled receivables):** Net accounts receivable + contract assets (net of contract liabilities) totaled $3,301M at Sep 30, 2024 vs. $2,881M at Sep 30, 2023 — a $420M increase in a single year, driven primarily by higher pass-through revenue volumes [S1]. The quality question is whether this reflects genuine growth or increasingly difficult-to-collect amounts.

**Critical FY2026 development — claims surge:** As noted above, claims within contract assets jumped from ~$400M (Sep 2025) to ~$680M (Mar 2026), a $280M increase in two quarters. Management attributed this to Middle East delayed payments and longer-than-expected claim resolutions [S2]. At ~$680M, claims now represent approximately 7% of NSR — material enough to warrant a dedicated impairment risk assessment. If even 20–30% of the $680M ultimately proves uncollectable, the earnings impact would be $136–204M pre-tax.

##### Pension and OPEB Obligations

AECOM maintains defined benefit pension plans in the UK and US. The 10-K discloses expected contributions of ~$35.4M in FY2025 [S1]. While not crisis-level, pension liabilities create earnings sensitivity to discount rate movements and asset return assumptions. UK pension plans in particular carry exposure to gilt yields.

##### Operating Leases (ASC 842)

AECOM has significant operating lease obligations reflecting its global office footprint. Under ASC 842, these appear as right-of-use assets and operating lease liabilities on the balance sheet, increasing reported liabilities. The lease liabilities are a real financial obligation but do not represent off-balance-sheet leverage risk post-ASC 842 adoption.

##### Joint Ventures and Off-Balance-Sheet Items

AECOM operates extensively through unconsolidated joint ventures. Its equity share of JV results passes through the income statement as "equity in earnings/losses." The ACAP situation demonstrates that JV-embedded risks can suddenly crystallize into large P&L charges. Management no longer operates ACAP as an active capital unit following the Q3 FY2024 team transition, but AECOM continues to hold residual JV interests under advisory agreements [S1].

---

#### 3. Cash Flow Quality

##### FCF Bridge: FY2025

| Component | FY2025 ($M) | Notes |
|-----------|------------|-------|
| Adj. EBITDA (NSR basis) | $1,203 | Management-reported |
| Less: Interest expense | ~$(185) | ~$185M based on FY2024 actuals; likely similar in FY2025 |
| Less: Cash taxes | ~$(200–220) | Estimated at ~25% effective rate on ~$800M pre-tax income |
| Less: CapEx | $(137) | XBRL-reported |
| Less: Working capital change | Variable | Drag in years of strong growth |
| Operating Cash Flow (GAAP) | $822 | XBRL-reported |
| Less: CapEx | $(137) | |
| **FCF (GAAP basis)** | **$685** | XBRL-reported |
| **Conversion: FCF/Adj. EBITDA** | **~57%** | Below 100% as expected |

The ~53–57% FCF conversion from Adj. EBITDA is structurally lower than EBITDA because:
1. **Cash interest** (~$185M) is a real cash cost not added back in EBITDA
2. **Cash taxes** (~$200M) — GAAP ETR was rising in FY2024 as pre-tax income normalized
3. **Working capital** — rapid NSR growth requires investment in unbilled receivables; in FY2024 there was $200M less working capital benefit vs. FY2023
4. **Trade receivables sold:** AECOM uses receivables factoring, selling receivables to financial institutions. FY2024 saw an incremental $32.7M increase in receivables sold. This is a minor quality concern — accelerating receivable sales can flatter operating cash flow.

**FCF vs. Net Income:** FCF of $685M (FY2025) is well above GAAP net income of $562M, which is a positive quality indicator. The primary bridges are D&A ($175–179M addback) and SBC ($61M addback), offset by working capital changes and capex.

**SBC-adjusted FCF:** At $61M annual SBC [S3], SBC-adjusted FCF would reduce to approximately $624M in FY2025. On management's preferred "adjusted free cash flow" definition (which also excludes certain restructuring payments), the number is higher — but an analyst focused on dilution should use the SBC-adjusted figure.

**FY2026 Q2 cash flow collapse:** Operating cash flow of $4M (down 98% YoY) in Q2 FY2026 and negative adjusted FCF of ~$(27)M represents the most significant near-term quality concern [S2]. This is discussed as an adversarial finding in Section 5.

---

#### 4. Earnings Quality Red Flags Checklist

- [x] **Accruals ratio — MODERATE CONCERN:** Operating income significantly exceeds cash from operations in some quarters, though on an annual basis FCF/Net Income conversion is favorable. The FY2026 Q2 cash flow collapse (near-zero OCF vs. $248M operating income) implies a large non-cash accruals gap in that single quarter — consistent with the $280M surge in disputed claims.

- [x] **Revenue recognition acceleration signals — ELEVATED CONCERN (NEW):** The jump from $400M to $680M in claims within contract assets in two quarters (FY2026 Q1–Q2) is an unusual accumulation of contested/disputed receivables. While this may reflect legitimate work performed, the inability to collect on time raises the question of whether revenue was recognized before it was truly earned/agreed upon with clients.

- [x] **Goodwill build (acquisition risk) — MODERATE CONCERN:** Goodwill at ~31% of total assets; the Cofely acquisition in FY2025 added ~$220M. The primary historical risk (URS merger goodwill) appears well-supported by ongoing profitability of the Americas segment, but any meaningful earnings deterioration could trigger impairment.

- [ ] **SBC as % of earnings — BENIGN:** At $61M (~0.4% of gross revenue, ~0.8% of NSR, ~$0.46/diluted share), SBC is immaterial relative to earnings and declining as a share of the enterprise compared to FY2016–FY2018 levels. This is one of the cleanest lines on the P&L.

- [x] **Pension underfunding — MINOR CONCERN:** UK and US defined benefit plans require ongoing contributions; $35.4M expected in FY2025 [S1]. Not a balance-sheet emergency but an ongoing cash drag that is excluded from Adjusted EBITDA.

- [ ] **Related-party transactions — CLEAN:** No material related-party transactions flagged in 10-K risk factors or audit committee disclosures [S1].

- [x] **Management guidance accuracy — MIXED:** AECOM has generally met or raised its Adj. EBITDA and Adj. EPS guidance annually since FY2021. However, cash flow guidance has been less reliable — the Q2 FY2026 cash flow miss was attributed to timing/claim delays that management apparently did not anticipate sufficiently in its guidance framework [S2].

- [x] **Restructuring normalization — PERSISTENT CONCERN:** As noted in Section 1, "non-recurring" restructuring has been booked in every single fiscal year FY2020–FY2024 (cumulative ~$600M+). This is a perennial adjustment that arguably inflates "normalized" earnings by $60–100M annually on a run-rate basis.

- [x] **Discontinued operations tail risk — ACTIVE CONCERN:** The civil construction divestiture continues to generate ongoing losses — $(105.0)M in FY2024 alone from contingent consideration revisions [S1]. These are genuinely non-recurring but have been a recurring feature for six consecutive years.

---

#### 5. Adversarial Research Sweep

##### 5A. May 2026 Securities Fraud Investigation — HIGH SALIENCE

**Finding:** Following AECOM's Q2 FY2026 earnings release on May 11, 2026, at least four law firms (Kirby McInerney LLP, Glancy Prongay Wolke & Rotter LLP, Law Offices of Frank R. Cruz, Law Offices of Howard G. Smith) announced securities fraud investigations into AECOM [S2]. The stock dropped approximately $9.55/share (~12%) on May 12, 2026.

**Trigger:** AECOM reported Q2 FY2026 operating cash flow of ~$4M (down 98% YoY) and negative adjusted FCF of ~$(27)M. Simultaneously, the 10-Q disclosed that claims within contract assets and other non-current assets had risen from ~$400M (Sep 2025) to ~$680M (Mar 2026) [S2].

**Management's explanation:** CFO Gaurav Kapoor cited "delayed payment timing in the Middle East business" and "longer-than-anticipated claim resolution on certain projects." The company stated underlying cash flow was "consistent with expectations" but for these timing items.

**Analyst/plaintiff theory:** Law firms are investigating whether AECOM made materially false or misleading statements about its financial condition — specifically, whether the $280M increase in contested claims represents revenue that was recognized prematurely or whether management was aware of collection difficulties prior to public disclosure.

**Assessment — MATERIAL RISK, UNRESOLVED:** This is the single most important near-term adversarial finding. The $680M claims balance on a ~$7.6B NSR base (~9%) is elevated. If even 15–25% proves uncollectable ($100–170M), the earnings hit would be significant. The investigations themselves are at the plaintiff-fishing stage (no formal SEC action announced) and may not result in class action litigation. However, the cash flow reversal warrants close monitoring in Q3 FY2026 disclosures.

---

##### 5B. False Claims Act — FEMA / Hurricane Katrina Relief — RESOLVED

**Finding:** In October 2023, AECOM agreed to pay $11.8 million to resolve False Claims Act allegations that it submitted false claims to FEMA for Louisiana educational facilities damaged by Hurricane Katrina. The DOJ press release described AECOM personnel submitting false photographs, claiming damage to non-existent buildings, and exaggerating repair estimates between 2006–2010 [S4].

**Whistleblower:** A qui tam relator earned a $2.4M award (20% of settlement) [S4].

**Assessment — RESOLVED, REPUTATIONAL IMPACT:** Settled pre-trial; $11.8M is immaterial to a company of AECOM's size. The conduct occurred 15+ years ago in a legacy support contract role. However, the episode confirms that AECOM has a compliance history on government contracts that investors should weight appropriately given the company's 46% government revenue concentration.

---

##### 5C. False Claims Act — Hanford Nuclear Site — RESOLVED

**Finding:** AECOM Energy & Construction, Inc. was a named defendant in a False Claims Act suit concerning the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant in Washington State. A group of four whistleblowers alleged that prime contractor Bechtel Corporation and subcontractor AECOM engaged in timekeeping fraud, including falsifying time records, hiring excess employees, and billing overtime to improper work codes. The case settled for $57.75M total across all defendants [S5].

**Assessment — RESOLVED, MODERATE HISTORICAL CONCERN:** The Hanford settlement predates current management's tenure and involved AECOM's legacy construction subsidiary (now divested). The divestiture of at-risk construction operations in FY2019–FY2020 removed the business units most exposed to this class of risk.

---

##### 5D. False Claims Act — Afghanistan Army Contract (MOSC-A) — DISMISSED

**Finding:** Whistleblower Hassan Foreman, a former AECOM finance employee, brought a False Claims Act suit alleging AECOM overbilled the Army under the Maintenance & Operational Support Contract in Afghanistan — specifically covering improper labor billing, inflated man-hour utilization, government property mismanagement, a crony contract with payroll processor Bluefish, and travel violations [S5].

**Outcome:** AECOM secured dismissal of this suit. A March 2025 court decision found that Foreman failed to show that inadequate contract performance was "material" to the government's payment decision — a required element for FCA liability [S5]. A Supreme Court cert petition was pending as of mid-2025.

**Assessment — DE MINIMIS RISK, NEARLY RESOLVED:** The district court dismissed the case; the Supreme Court cert petition represents residual tail risk but is unlikely to succeed given the established materiality standard.

---

##### 5E. FCPA / Anti-Corruption History — HISTORICAL, LOW CURRENT RISK

**Finding:** AECOM disclosed in an October 2008 8-K that internal investigation of its German subsidiary Earth Tech Klartechnik GmbH (ETK) revealed that payments made by a subcontractor for a JV partner may have violated the FCPA, relating to 2005–2006 conduct. AECOM cooperated with regulators. No formal DOJ/SEC enforcement action was publicly recorded against AECOM itself [S6].

**Assessment — HISTORICAL, RESOLVED WITHOUT PENALTY:** The ETK situation was self-disclosed and resulted in no formal AECOM enforcement action. The current compliance posture should be evaluated in the context of AECOM's 2020 divestitures, which eliminated the at-risk construction international businesses that carried the highest FCPA exposure.

---

##### 5F. World Bank Debarment (2017) — RESOLVED

**Finding:** In July 2017, the World Bank debarred AECOM Asia Company Limited (18 months) and AECOM New Zealand Limited (6 months) for sanctionable practices. AECOM Asia's predecessor (Metcalf & Eddy) failed to disclose a conflict of interest on a Bengbu, China environmental project and misrepresented key staff input on a Tai Basin project. AECOM New Zealand misrepresented expert availability in a Vietnam hydropower project proposal [S6].

**Assessment — RESOLVED, LOW CURRENT RISK:** Debarment periods have long since expired. These were bid-related misrepresentations in Asian development bank projects, not systemic fraud. The conduct involved legacy acquired entities (Metcalf & Eddy was an URS acquisition).

---

##### 5G. AECOM Calls FCA Army Billing Suit 'Meritless' — ACTIVE MONITORING

**Finding:** Separate from the MOSC-A case, Law360 reported in 2024–2025 that AECOM labeled another False Claims Act suit concerning Army billing as "meritless" [S5]. This case appears distinct from the Foreman Afghanistan case and may involve separate Army billing conduct.

**Assessment — REQUIRES MONITORING:** Insufficient public detail to size exposure. No settlement amounts disclosed publicly.

---

##### 5H. Hong Kong Airport Authority Dispute — LOW MATERIALITY

**Finding:** A Hong Kong court criticized AECOM over conduct related to the Airport Authority's third runway project, finding that AECOM "exploited" an expert witness [S6]. No financial penalties or settlement reported.

**Assessment — REPUTATIONAL, NO FINANCIAL IMPACT:** This is a procedural/conduct finding in a third-party litigation context, not a direct claim against AECOM.

---

##### 5I. No Formal Short-Seller Reports Found

Searches for formal short-seller campaigns (Hindenburg, Citron, etc.) against AECOM returned no results. Short interest has historically run below 3% of float [S7]. The May 2026 securities fraud investigation by plaintiffs' firms appears to have been triggered by the cash flow miss, not by any coordinated short campaign.

---

##### Summary Materiality Table

| Finding | Status | Financial Exposure | Materiality |
|---------|---------|--------------------|-------------|
| Securities fraud investigation (May 2026) | Active / Unresolved | Unknown; underlying claims ~$680M | HIGH |
| $680M claims receivable accumulation | Active | $100–200M downside risk if partial write-off | HIGH |
| FCA — FEMA / Katrina | Settled | $11.8M (paid) | LOW |
| FCA — Hanford (Bechtel-AECOM) | Settled | $57.75M shared | LOW |
| FCA — Afghanistan MOSC-A | Dismissed | De minimis | VERY LOW |
| FCPA — ETK Germany | Resolved (2008) | None | VERY LOW |
| World Bank debarment (2017) | Expired | None | VERY LOW |

---

#### 6. ACAP Deep Dive

##### What Was AECOM Capital (ACAP)?

AECOM Capital was a real estate investment and development subsidiary that AECOM created to deploy capital into US urban real estate projects. The strategic rationale was to generate higher returns than pure fee-based consulting by co-investing as a general partner in "build-to-core" development in top US markets. AECOM viewed ACAP as a way to leverage its construction expertise and client relationships to generate proprietary deal flow [S1].

ACAP invested primarily as a co-general partner in a portfolio of multi-family and mixed-use real estate JVs, targeting institutional-quality assets in gateway cities. At peak, ACAP managed approximately $3B+ of real estate development projects.

##### Why Was It Impaired ($304M, FY2023)?

The FY2023 10-K and associated SEC disclosures describe the following sequence:

1. **Commercial real estate market deterioration:** Rising interest rates in 2022–2023 significantly reduced the fair value of stabilized income-producing real estate, particularly Class A urban multifamily properties — exactly the type ACAP held.

2. **Equity method accounting:** ACAP's JV interests were recorded under the equity method. When underlying property values declined below the JV's carrying value, AECOM was required to record its proportionate share of impairment losses through the income statement.

3. **$279.4M equity in JV losses (FY2023):** Primarily reflects impairment charges taken at the JV level, flowing through to AECOM's consolidated P&L [S1]. In addition, AECOM itself recorded an $307M impairment to reduce the carrying value of ACAP investments to estimated fair value (per search results) [S8].

4. **Intent change trigger:** In Q4 FY2023, AECOM entered into a term sheet to transition the ACAP team to a new third-party platform, and concluded it no longer had the intent to retain these investments long enough to allow for market recovery — accelerating the recognition of impairment that might otherwise have been deferred under a hold-to-recovery strategy [S8].

5. **Team transition completed Q3 FY2024:** The ACAP management team transferred to an independent platform; AECOM retained advisory agreements on the remaining wind-down portfolio [S1].

##### Is the Commercial RE Exposure Fully Exited?

Not fully. As of FY2024, ACAP still reported $(26.9)M in equity losses from JVs (versus $(303.9)M in FY2023), indicating residual JV positions remain [S1]. The trajectory is clearly toward full exit: revenue is negligible ($1.4M), the team has left, and the remaining JV interests are in wind-down mode. AECOM expects to shed ACAP-related assets over several more years as the JVs sell or recapitalize their properties.

##### Lessons

1. **Strategic diversification into principal investment was ill-suited** for a professional services firm whose core advantage is fee-based intellectual capital, not balance sheet deployment.
2. **Concentrated exposure to interest-rate-sensitive assets** created large balance sheet risk that materialized exactly when it should have been most foreseeable (rising rates).
3. **Positive lesson:** AECOM recognized the strategic misfit quickly (exit announced Q4 FY2023, team transferred by Q3 FY2024) and has since refocused capital on buybacks/dividends. The $279M FY2023 loss, while painful, has not recurred in FY2024 (losses down 91% to $26.9M).

---

#### 7. Statement Adjustments for Modeling

The following adjustments are recommended to arrive at "economic earnings" — what AECOM earns on a sustainable, recurring, owner-earnings basis:

##### A. SBC Normalization
**Direction:** Add back as non-cash, but credit the dilution in share count.  
**Amount:** ~$61M annually (FY2024–FY2025) — this is already very low relative to EBITDA (~5%) and should not be double-counted if using diluted share count in valuation.

##### B. Amortization of Acquired Intangibles
**Direction:** Add back in EBITDA-based valuation; do NOT add back in owner-earnings DCF.  
**Amount:** Not separately disclosed in XBRL; estimated $40–60M based on D&A composition. The full D&A line (~$175–179M in FY2023–FY2024) is primarily amortization rather than depreciation given AECOM's asset-light model. Some portion represents genuine economic cost (the finite useful life of acquired customer relationships).

##### C. Restructuring Normalization
**Direction:** Model ~$75–100M as a normalized annual charge rather than excluding entirely.  
**Amount:** AECOM has booked restructuring in every year since at least FY2018. The FY2023 peak of $188M and FY2024 level of $99M bracket a reasonable normalized estimate of ~$90M.  
**Impact on "clean" EPS:** Normalizing $90M pre-tax restructuring at 25% tax rate = $67.5M after-tax = ~$0.50/share reduction to adjusted EPS.

##### D. Pension Expense Normalization
**Direction:** Use service cost (economically relevant) rather than total pension cost; exclude mark-to-market components from adjusted earnings.  
**Amount:** $35.4M expected annual contribution (FY2025). Most of this is already within GAAP cost of revenue or G&A, but pension interest costs / mark-to-market can be volatile.

##### E. Claims Receivable Risk Reserve
**Direction:** Until the $680M claims balance normalizes (expected within 2–4 quarters per management), apply a haircut to modeled working capital and FCF.  
**Amount:** Recommend a $100–150M "credit loss reserve" on claims receivable in any conservative FCF projection for FY2026. This is a scenario-specific adjustment that will reverse if claims are collected.

##### F. Discontinued Operations
**Direction:** Exclude entirely from adjusted continuing operations modeling. The contingent consideration liability from the civil construction sale will tail off; management expects remaining exposure to be resolved in the next 1–2 years.

##### Summary — "Economic EPS" Estimate for FY2025

| Item | EPS Impact |
|------|-----------|
| Management Adj. EPS (FY2025) | $5.26 |
| Less: Normalized restructuring ($90M × 75% after-tax / 133M shares) | $(0.51) |
| Less: SBC (dilution already in diluted share count) | — |
| Economic (Owner-Earnings) EPS | ~$4.75 |

This $4.75 "economic" figure is the appropriate base for an unlevered DCF or P/E-based valuation, versus management's $5.26 adjusted EPS.

---

#### 8. Source Index

| ID | Source |
|----|--------|
| [S1] | AECOM FY2024 10-K (filed November 19, 2024), SEC EDGAR Accession 0001410578-24-002030 — `10K_FY2024_summary.md` |
| [S2] | AECOM Q2 FY2026 10-Q (filed May 12, 2026); securities fraud investigation announcements from Kirby McInerney LLP, Glancy Prongay Wolke & Rotter LLP, Law Offices of Frank R. Cruz, Law Offices of Howard G. Smith (May 2026) — via BusinessWire / National Law Review |
| [S3] | AECOM XBRL Financial Data Summary, SEC EDGAR CIK 0000868857 — `xbrl_summary.md` |
| [S4] | DOJ Press Release, "AECOM to Pay $11.8 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations in Connection with Hurricane Disaster Relief," October 24, 2023; DHS OIG press release same date; TZ Legal — Fraud Fighters whistleblower summary |
| [S5] | Bloomberg Law, "AECOM Whistleblower Revives Part of Afghanistan Contract Suit"; "AECOM Secures Dismissal of Whistleblower's Army Fraud Lawsuit" (March 2025); Law360, "AECOM Calls FCA Suit Alleging False Army Billing 'Meritless'"; Whistleblowers Blog, Hanford $57.75M settlement |
| [S6] | Stanford FCPA Clearinghouse, AECOM Technology Corporation investigation entry; World Bank Press Release, "World Bank Debars AECOM Asia Company Limited and AECOM New Zealand Limited," July 14, 2017; South China Morning Post, Hong Kong airport expert case |
| [S7] | MarketBeat, Benzinga short interest data for ACM; StockAnalysis.com financial summary — `stockanalysis_summary.md` |
| [S8] | Search results citing FY2023 10-K ACAP impairment ($307M carrying value reduction); AECOM Capital LinkedIn / Law Insider definition |

## Deeper Financial Analysis

The fundamental tier ($1.00) adds 8 dimensions not included here:

- Revenue Breakdown — segment revenue, geographic mix, product-line margins
- Financial Trends — QoQ momentum, leading indicators, inflection points
- Balance Sheet — debt structure, dilution risk, working capital dynamics
- Capital Allocation — ROIC, buyback cadence, reinvestment efficiency
- Earnings Analysis — beats/misses, guidance vs actuals, transcript highlights
- Competitive Positioning — market share, pricing power, peer benchmarks
- Industry Context — TAM, sector tailwinds/headwinds, regulatory backdrop

**API endpoint:** GET /api/v1/research/ACM/fundamental

## Navigation

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