# Amplitude, Inc. (AMPL) — Financial Analysis

**Exchange:** Nasdaq  
**Coverage as of:** 2026-Q2  
**Updated:** 2026-06-17  
**Tier:** Free primer (step 2 of 19)  
**Sibling pages:** /stocks/ampl/thesis · /memo/ampl

## Financial Snapshot

---
source: coverage-next-full
ticker: AMPL
company: Amplitude, Inc.
step: 04
title: Financial Snapshot
date: 2026-06-14
---

### Step 04 — Financial Snapshot: Amplitude, Inc. (AMPL)

---

#### 1. Statement Quality Assessment

##### GAAP vs. Non-GAAP Reconciliation

Amplitude, like most high-growth SaaS companies, presents both GAAP and non-GAAP financial results. The key non-GAAP adjustments are:

1. **Stock-Based Compensation (SBC):** The single largest adjustment. FY2025 SBC was **$92.1M**, representing 26.8% of revenue. [S3: xbrl_summary.md, §SBC; S2: stockanalysis_summary.md, §Cash Flow] This converts GAAP operating loss of -$96.0M into a non-GAAP operating profit of +$1.2M.
2. **Amortization of Intangibles and Capitalized Software:** Amplitude capitalizes internal-use software development costs and amortizes acquired intangibles from the Command AI acquisition (completed FY2024). Amortization of capitalized software was approximately $3.4M in FY2025 per the 10-K MD&A. [S1: 10-K FY2025, §Gross Profit commentary]
3. **Restructuring Charges:** Amplitude undertook workforce reductions from FY2022 through FY2024 as part of its efficiency drive. Restructuring charges are excluded from non-GAAP results.
4. **Income Tax Effects:** Non-GAAP adjustments include tax effects of the above items (typically modest for a loss-stage company).

##### Are the Non-GAAP Adjustments Reasonable?

The exclusion of amortization of intangibles and restructuring charges is standard practice and broadly accepted. The SBC exclusion is where the analysis gets more nuanced.

**The case for excluding SBC:** SBC is a non-cash charge that does not consume cash in the current period. For FCF-centric analysis, OCF already nets out SBC's tax effects, so the cash generation picture is not distorted.

**The case against excluding SBC:** SBC represents real economic dilution to common shareholders. When Amplitude adds ~132M diluted shares, grants 10–15M RSUs annually, and reports non-GAAP "profitability," the $92M SBC cost is being absorbed by existing shareholders through equity dilution rather than cash outflows. FCF should be analyzed alongside total share count growth to capture the true economics. At 26.8% of revenue, Amplitude's SBC ratio is at the high end of SaaS norms — industry leaders typically target 10–15% of revenue in SBC. This is a valid criticism addressed in detail in Section 5 (Adversarial Research Sweep).

##### Earnings Quality: FCF vs. GAAP Net Loss

GAAP net loss in FY2025 was -$88.5M while FCF was +$23.5M — a $112M gap. The gap is primarily explained by:
- SBC add-back: +$92.1M to operating cash flow
- Deferred revenue increase (advance billing from customers): net positive to working capital
- D&A: +$9.6M
- Offset by: working capital uses, capitalized software spending

The FCF figure is real cash — but it is substantially inflated relative to true "owner earnings" by the SBC add-back. A shareholder-normalized FCF (subtracting SBC to approximate the true cash cost) would be approximately: $23.5M - $92.1M = **-$68.6M** in FY2025. This normalized figure better represents the economic reality for long-term shareholders. The gap between reported FCF (+$23.5M) and shareholder-normalized FCF (-$68.6M) is the central tension in evaluating Amplitude's financial health.

---

#### 2. Income Statement Quality

##### Revenue Recognition Policy

Amplitude recognizes subscription revenue **ratably over the contract term** per ASC 606 (revenue recognized over the period in which the performance obligation — platform access — is satisfied). [S1: 10-K FY2025, §Business Model] This means:
- Upfront annual or multi-year bookings do not flow through income immediately; they enter deferred revenue and are recognized pro-rata monthly.
- Revenue is smooth and predictable, not lumpy — a quality signal.
- Reported revenue lags booking acceleration; RPO ($427.4M, growing 31% YoY) provides the forward signal.

Professional services revenue (~2% of total) is recognized upon delivery of implementation milestones, which introduces minimal lumpiness to an otherwise smooth recognition pattern.

##### Deferred Revenue as a Leading Indicator

Deferred revenue at December 31, 2025 was **$121.9M**. [S1: 10-K FY2025, §Balance Sheet Highlights] This represents cash already collected for services not yet delivered — a structurally cash-flow-positive characteristic of the SaaS model. Deferred revenue growing in line with ARR growth (+17% YoY) confirms that renewal rates and new bookings are being maintained and that the billing cycle is healthy.

##### Operating Leverage Trajectory

GAAP operating margin has improved from -44% (FY2021) to -37% (FY2023) to -28% (FY2025). [S2: stockanalysis_summary.md, §Profitability Margins] This trajectory is directionally correct but the pace is modest. Key drivers of margin improvement:

- **R&D leverage:** R&D spend was flat in dollar terms at $97.6M (FY2024 and FY2025), while revenue grew 15%. R&D as % of revenue fell from 32.6% (FY2024) to 28.4% (FY2025). The flat R&D headcount (~780 employees, down from ~1,100 at peak) and AI-assisted coding (management noted >90% of shipped code is AI-written) have been the primary drivers of this leverage. [S1: 10-K FY2025, §Headcount; S4: consensus.md, §Q1 FY2026 Highlights]
- **G&A leverage:** G&A declined from 21.3% of revenue (FY2024) to 18.7% (FY2025) as the company grows into its fixed corporate overhead base.
- **S&M counter-trend:** Sales & Marketing increased 12% in FY2025 to $188M (+$19.7M), still consuming 54.8% of revenue. [S1: 10-K FY2025, §Operating Expenses] This is the primary drag on operating leverage. The incremental S&M investment is consistent with the upmarket enterprise motion but raises questions about sales efficiency (ARR per quota-carrying rep).

---

#### 3. Balance Sheet Strength

##### Cash and Liquidity Position

| Item | FY2025 (Dec 31) | FY2024 (Dec 31) | Change |
|------|----------------|----------------|--------|
| Cash & Cash Equivalents | $81.1M | $171.7M | -$90.6M |
| Marketable Securities | $171.4M | $69.4M | +$102.0M |
| **Total Liquid Assets** | **$252.5M** | **$241.1M** | **+$11.4M** |
| Deferred Revenue (current) | $121.9M | — | — |
| Total Assets | $420.7M | $445.9M | -$25.2M |
| Total Debt (leases) | $6.9M | $1.8M | +$5.1M |
| Accumulated Deficit | -$546.4M | — | — |

[S1: 10-K FY2025, §Balance Sheet; S2: stockanalysis_summary.md; S3: xbrl_summary.md]

**Important context on the cash decline:** The $90.6M decline in cash and cash equivalents from FY2024 to FY2025 is partly misleading — it reflects a deliberate shift from cash into marketable securities (+$102.0M increase), not cash outflows. Total liquid assets actually increased slightly ($241.1M → $252.5M), confirming no deterioration in liquidity. [S3: xbrl_summary.md, §Cash and Notes; S1: 10-K FY2025, §Liquidity Commentary]

However, at Q1 FY2026 (March 31, 2026), total liquid assets declined to approximately **$181.9M** ($86.6M cash + $95.3M ST investments), a reduction of ~$70M from FY2025 year-end. [S2: stockanalysis_summary.md, §Quarterly Balance Sheet] This decline reflects the seasonally weak Q1 FCF (-$13.2M) combined with RSU tax withholding payments and working capital timing. This warrants monitoring in Q2 FY2026 — if liquid assets continue to decline, the company may need to reassess its capital allocation priorities.

##### Debt Profile

Total debt is essentially zero in economic terms. The $6.9M in "debt" is entirely operating lease obligations (office space). [S2: stockanalysis_summary.md, §Leverage Ratios] There is no bank debt, no convertible notes, and no credit facility drawn. Amplitude was funded exclusively by equity capital (IPO proceeds + pre-IPO venture financing) and has no financial leverage risk.

##### Stockholders' Equity and Accumulated Deficit

Stockholders' equity was $245.3M at FY2025 year-end, declining steadily from $306.5M at the time of the IPO (FY2021). [S2: stockanalysis_summary.md, §Annual Balance Sheet] The accumulated deficit of -$546.4M reflects the cumulative GAAP net losses since inception. Notably, SBC adds back to APIC even as it flows through the P&L, so equity has not declined as quickly as the net loss trajectory would suggest — the equity value preservation comes from SBC accreting to the balance sheet.

##### Liquidity Runway

At the current FCF generation rate (~$23.5M/year), and with $181.9M in liquid assets (Q1 FY2026), Amplitude has liquidity to sustain operations for several years without additional capital raises. However, the more relevant constraint is whether management can achieve sustained FCF positivity. The Q1 FY2026 FCF of -$13.2M (seasonal) and the revised FY2026 non-GAAP operating income guidance of only $2.5–6.5M suggest the path to material FCF improvement remains uncertain. There is no near-term solvency risk, but the cash burn from SBC (real dilution) and the depletion of liquid assets from IPO proceeds to current levels (~$182M from $307M peak in 2021) reflects years of economic losses.

---

#### 4. Cash Flow Quality

##### Operating Cash Flow Analysis

| Period | Operating CF | FCF (Co.-Defined) | SBC (Non-Cash) | OCF ex-SBC |
|--------|-------------|-------------------|----------------|------------|
| FY2021 | -$31.7M | -$33.2M | $34.4M | -$66.1M |
| FY2022 | -$5.4M | -$9.0M | $67.2M | -$72.6M |
| FY2023 | $25.6M | $24.3M | $88.3M | -$62.7M |
| FY2024 | $18.5M | $11.7M | $100.0M | -$81.5M |
| FY2025 | $29.8M | $23.5M | $92.1M | -$62.3M |

[S3: xbrl_summary.md, §Operating Cash Flow; S2: stockanalysis_summary.md, §Annual Cash Flow]

The column "OCF ex-SBC" (Operating Cash Flow minus SBC, the non-cash add-back) illustrates a critical point: **on a shareholder-normalized basis, Amplitude has never generated positive operating cash flow.** The FCF positive trajectory beginning in FY2023 is entirely a function of the SBC add-back exceeding the operating cash deficit. SBC has consistently been 3-5x the magnitude of reported FCF. This does not mean the business is failing — it means the "profit" is being paid for in equity dilution rather than cash — but investors must be clear-eyed about this distinction.

##### Deferred Revenue Dynamics

Deferred revenue is a structurally positive working capital item for SaaS. Amplitude bills annually in advance, so new and renewal subscription bookings create immediate cash inflows that are recognized as revenue over the following 12 months. This advance-billing dynamic means OCF tracks ahead of GAAP revenue in periods of growth acceleration. The $121.9M in deferred revenue as of FY2025 year-end [S1: 10-K FY2025, §Balance Sheet] provides a direct forward revenue signal for the next 12 months.

##### Capital Expenditure Intensity

CapEx was $1.6M in FY2025 — negligible at 0.5% of revenue. [S2: stockanalysis_summary.md, §Annual Cash Flow] This reflects Amplitude's cloud-native, asset-light infrastructure model. The company's primary "capital" investment is in human capital (employees) and cloud hosting costs (which flow through COGS, not CapEx). Company-defined FCF also subtracts capitalized internal-use software development costs of approximately $4.7M in FY2025 (the difference between OCF minus CapEx and disclosed FCF of $23.5M). This is the appropriate definition for a SaaS business — software development costs should be treated as capital expenditure regardless of accounting classification.

---

#### 5. Adversarial Research Sweep

This section proactively examines the red flags, concerns, and investigative threads that a rigorous independent analyst should pursue before establishing a position.

##### The May 6, 2026 Guidance Cut and Securities Fraud Investigation

On **May 6, 2026**, Amplitude reported Q1 FY2026 earnings (revenue beat by $0.6M) but simultaneously revised FY2026 non-GAAP operating income guidance downward from $7–13M to **$2.5–6.5M** — a reduction of approximately $4.5–7.5M at the midpoint. The stock fell approximately **21% in a single session** (from ~$7.52 to ~$5.91). [S4: consensus.md, §Key Recent Events]

The guidance cut was attributed to two factors: (1) higher AI infrastructure costs associated with ramping AI product capabilities, and (2) investment required to support the Statsig strategic partnership. What made this disclosure notable — and potentially actionable — is that Amplitude had only **12 weeks earlier** (February 18, 2026 Q4 FY2025 earnings call) provided initial FY2026 guidance of $7–13M non-GAAP operating income. The downward revision to $2.5–6.5M came just one quarter into that guided year.

**Pomerantz LLP Investigation:** Following the stock drop, Pomerantz LLP announced a securities fraud investigation into Amplitude and certain officers and directors. [S4: consensus.md, §Financial/Regulatory; full PR: prnewswire.com/news-releases, June 2026] As of June 2026, no formal complaint has been filed. Pomerantz investigations are common following large stock drops and frequently do not result in formal litigation. However, the pattern — initial guidance, rapid reversal, large stock drop — warrants independent assessment of whether management had material information at the time of the February guidance that should have been disclosed. Specifically: were the AI infrastructure cost overruns foreseeable as of Q4 FY2025 earnings? Was the Statsig deal already contemplated at the time of initial guidance? If the answers to either question are yes, disclosure adequacy is a legitimate concern.

**Assessment:** The guidance cut itself is not unusual for a company navigating AI infrastructure buildout costs. The speed and magnitude of the reversal is the concerning element. Investors should scrutinize Q4 FY2025 earnings call transcripts and February 18, 2026 10-K commentary for any language that foreshadowed the cost pressures that were disclosed just three months later.

##### SBC as % of Revenue: Predatory Dilution or Normal Growth SaaS?

At **26.8% of revenue in FY2025**, Amplitude's SBC ratio is elevated versus SaaS industry norms:

| Benchmark | SBC/Revenue |
|-----------|------------|
| Best-in-class SaaS (mature) | 5–10% |
| Growth SaaS (typical) | 10–15% |
| High-SBC growth SaaS | 15–25% |
| AMPL FY2025 | 26.8% |
| AMPL FY2024 | 33.4% (includes Command AI one-time) |
| AMPL FY2023 | 31.9% |

[S3: xbrl_summary.md, §SBC; S2: stockanalysis_summary.md, §Cash Flow]

The FY2024 spike to 33.4% included a one-time acceleration of unvested equity from the Command AI acquisition. The FY2025 return to 26.8% represents normalization but remains high. At $92.1M in SBC on $343.2M in revenue, Amplitude is transferring approximately **27 cents of every revenue dollar to employees through equity compensation** — before any operating expenses are covered.

**Is this predatory?** The term is strong, but the economics are challenging. If AMPL were a private company, this level of SBC would not be visible as a separate line item — it would just be cash compensation. The public market "sees" it because it is disaggregated as a non-cash charge. The issue is whether the talent cost is generating commensurate value creation. Three data points suggest the SBC level may be partially justifiable: (1) the company is retaining talent through competitive equity packages in a market where engineering talent is expensive; (2) SBC has been declining in absolute terms (FY2022 was $67.2M on $238M revenue, or 28%; FY2025 is $92.1M on $343M, also ~27%, so the ratio is improving slowly); (3) management has explicitly targeted further SBC reduction as part of the profitability roadmap.

**The shareholder impact:** The more concrete concern is **dilution**. The total share count at IPO (September 2021) was approximately 130M shares; by FY2025, the weighted average was 132M (basic) with diluted shares closer to 141M when including unvested RSUs and options. This implies approximately 8–10% dilution since IPO — manageable by historical standards but real. The trajectory matters: if SBC stays at $90M/year on a $350M revenue base and the share price remains at ~$7, the implied annual equity grant rate is approximately 12–14M shares/year, or ~10% of float annually. This is the most material ongoing concern for AMPL shareholders.

##### Share Count Increase Since IPO

| Period | Weighted Avg Basic Shares | % Change from IPO |
|--------|--------------------------|-------------------|
| FY2021 (partial, post-IPO) | 51.4M (partial year) | Base |
| FY2022 | 111.4M | — |
| FY2023 | 116.9M | — |
| FY2024 | 123.9M | — |
| FY2025 | 132.0M | — |
| Q1 FY2026 | ~133M | ~+3% vs FY2025 |

[S3: xbrl_summary.md, §Weighted Average Shares]

The weighted average shares increased from ~111M (FY2022, first full public year) to ~132M (FY2025) — approximately **+19% dilution** over three years. The direct listing in September 2021 converted all preferred shares to common; the FY2022 base of 111M is the most comparable full-year public starting point. Annual share count growth has averaged ~6% since the direct listing, primarily from RSU vesting and employee stock purchase plan contributions. For long-term shareholders, this is a meaningful but not catastrophic dilution rate — it becomes more material if the stock price remains depressed.

##### Short Seller / Negative Research

No prominent short-seller reports specifically targeting Amplitude's accounting or business model have been publicly identified in recent years. The company's short interest is approximately 7.45% of float (~7.2M shares), elevated relative to historical norms but not at the 20%+ levels that typically signal organized short-selling campaigns. [S4: consensus.md, §Short Interest] The marginal increase in short interest around the May 2026 guidance cut suggests opportunistic short positioning rather than fundamental short thesis development.

**Areas to investigate independently:** (1) Whether Amplitude's ARR definition includes trial expansions or one-time commitments that inflate the headline figure; management has not restated ARR in prior periods, which is a relative positive; (2) Whether the NRR recovery from 96% to 106% is durable or driven by temporary expansion deals that pull forward future cohort expansion; (3) Whether the Statsig partnership ARR ($16M projected) is committed or aspirational.

##### Historical Guidance Accuracy

Based on available data, Amplitude has generally met or modestly exceeded revenue guidance while occasionally missing profitability targets. Q1 FY2026 showed a revenue beat of $0.6M (0.6%) but a non-GAAP EPS miss of $0.01 — consistent with a pattern of conservative revenue guidance and less-controlled cost guidance. The February 2026 → May 2026 operating income guidance reversal is the most significant guidance miss in recent history and calls into question the accuracy of management's near-term cost visibility, particularly around AI infrastructure spending.

**Historical note:** During the FY2022–2023 period, AMPL missed multiple NRR targets as the business deteriorated faster than guidance implied, suggesting management may have been slow to incorporate macro headwinds into forward guidance. This is a recurring risk given the subscription-lag between booking trends and revenue recognition.

##### Revenue Recognition Concerns

No revenue restatements have been identified. KPMG has been Amplitude's auditor since the IPO. KPMG issued unqualified (clean) audit opinions for FY2024 and FY2025. [S1: 10-K FY2025, §Filing Details] Going concern language is absent from the FY2025 10-K, which is expected given $252M in liquid assets. Internal controls: the 10-K does not disclose any material weaknesses as of December 31, 2025.

**Capitalized software as an area of scrutiny:** The increase in capitalized internal-use software costs from FY2023 to FY2024 (contributing to the company-defined FCF differential from simple OCF-minus-CapEx) warrants monitoring. If capitalized software costs increase materially, it shifts expenses from the income statement to the balance sheet temporarily — a qualitative risk that is mitigated by the relatively small dollar amounts involved (~$4–5M annually).

##### Structural Risk Summary

| Risk | Severity | Status |
|------|---------|--------|
| SBC dilution at 27% of revenue | High | Ongoing — management targeting reduction |
| May 2026 guidance cut + securities investigation | Medium | Pomerantz investigation active; no formal filing |
| Pricing transition risk (MTU shift) | Medium | 25% of ARR transitioned; 75% still pending |
| NRR re-trough risk | Medium | Currently 106%; requires monitoring |
| AI infrastructure cost overruns | Medium | Caused May 2026 guidance cut; uncertain trajectory |
| Revenue recognition quality | Low | ASC 606 ratable, clean audit opinion |
| Liquidity risk | Low | $182M liquid assets, positive FCF |
| Customer concentration | Low | No customer >10% of revenue |

---

#### 6. Key Financial Metrics Table

| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | Q1 FY2026 |
|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------|
| **Revenue** | $276.3M | $299.3M | $343.2M | $93.5M |
| **Revenue Growth (YoY)** | +16% | +8% | +15% | +17% |
| **ARR** | — | $312M | $366M | $374M |
| **NRR** | ~107% | 97% | 104% | 106% |
| **Gross Profit** | $204.4M | $222.3M | $253.9M | $68.3M |
| **GAAP Gross Margin** | 74.0% | 74.3% | 74.0% | 73.1% |
| **Non-GAAP Gross Margin** | ~76% | 77% | 76% | — |
| **R&D** | ~$100M | $97.6M | $97.6M | — |
| **R&D % Revenue** | ~36% | 32.6% | 28.4% | — |
| **S&M** | ~$153M | $168.3M | $188.0M | — |
| **S&M % Revenue** | ~55% | 56.2% | 54.8% | — |
| **G&A** | ~$54M | $63.9M | $64.3M | — |
| **G&A % Revenue** | ~20% | 21.3% | 18.7% | — |
| **GAAP Operating Loss** | -$102.5M | -$107.4M | -$96.0M | -$24.1M |
| **GAAP Operating Margin** | -37.1% | -35.9% | -28.0% | -25.8% |
| **Non-GAAP Operating Income** | ~-$6.2M | -$4.0M | +$1.2M | — |
| **SBC** | $88.3M | $100.0M | $92.1M | $20.0M |
| **SBC % Revenue** | 31.9% | 33.4% | 26.8% | 21.4% |
| **GAAP Net Loss** | -$90.4M | -$94.3M | -$88.5M | -$23.3M |
| **GAAP EPS (Basic)** | -$0.77 | -$0.76 | -$0.67 | -$0.17 |
| **Operating Cash Flow** | $25.6M | $18.5M | $29.8M | -$11.6M |
| **FCF (Co.-Defined)** | $24.3M | $11.7M | $23.5M | -$13.2M |
| **FCF Margin** | 8.8% | 3.9% | 6.9% | neg |
| **Rule of 40 Score** | ~24.8 | ~11.9 | ~21.9 | — |
| **Cash + ST Investments** | $322.4M | $241.1M | $252.5M | $181.9M |
| **Total Debt** | $3.6M | $1.8M | $6.9M | $6.6M |
| **Weighted Avg Shares (Basic)** | 116.9M | 123.9M | 132.0M | 133M |
| **Customers ≥ $100K ARR** | — | 591 | 698 | 727 |
| **Customers ≥ $1M ARR** | — | 42 | 56 | — |
| **RPO** | — | — | — | $427.4M |
| **Headcount** | ~900 | ~820 | ~780 | ~780 |

[S1: 10-K FY2025; S2: stockanalysis_summary.md; S3: xbrl_summary.md; S4: consensus.md]

---

#### 7. Source Index

| Reference | Source |
|-----------|--------|
| S1 | SEC 10-K FY2025 (filed Feb 19, 2026) — `/AMPL_financials/sec_filings/10K_FY2025_summary.md` |
| S2 | StockAnalysis.com Financial Summary — `/AMPL_financials/other/stockanalysis_summary.md` |
| S3 | SEC XBRL Data Summary — `/AMPL_financials/xbrl/xbrl_summary.md` |
| S4 | Market Data & Analyst Consensus — `/AMPL_financials/other/consensus.md` |

## Deeper Financial Analysis

The fundamental tier ($1.00) adds 8 dimensions not included here:

- Revenue Breakdown — segment revenue, geographic mix, product-line margins
- Financial Trends — QoQ momentum, leading indicators, inflection points
- Balance Sheet — debt structure, dilution risk, working capital dynamics
- Capital Allocation — ROIC, buyback cadence, reinvestment efficiency
- Earnings Analysis — beats/misses, guidance vs actuals, transcript highlights
- Competitive Positioning — market share, pricing power, peer benchmarks
- Industry Context — TAM, sector tailwinds/headwinds, regulatory backdrop

**API endpoint:** GET /api/v1/research/AMPL/fundamental

## Navigation

- Overview: /stocks/ampl
- Financials (this page): /stocks/ampl/financials
- Thesis: /stocks/ampl/thesis
- Investment Memo: /memo/ampl
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