# TopBuild Corp. (BLD)

**Exchange:** NYSE  
**Coverage as of:** 2026-Q2  
**Updated:** 2026-05-27  
**Report type:** Primer (steps 1–3 of 19)  
**API endpoint:** GET /api/v1/research/BLD/primer

## Business Model

---
source: coverage-next-full
ticker: BLD
company: TopBuild Corp
step: 01
title: Business Model & Overview
created: 2026-05-27
---

### Step 01 — Business Model & Overview: TopBuild Corp (BLD)

---

#### 1. Executive Summary

TopBuild Corp is the largest installer and specialty distributor of insulation products in the United States, operating at the critical intersection of building products manufacturing and construction services [S1]. The company was spun off from Masco Corporation in June 2015 and has grown through a combination of organic branch expansion and systematic M&A, scaling from ~$1.9B revenue at spin to $5.4B by FY2025 [S2]. In 2025, two transformative acquisitions — Specialty Products and Insulation (SPI) for $1.0B and Progressive Roofing for $810M — repositioned BLD beyond residential insulation into commercial/industrial mechanical insulation and commercial roofing services [S3].

---

#### 2. Business Model

##### Value Proposition
TopBuild provides two complementary services to the construction industry:

1. **Installation Services:** A builder or contractor hires BLD to physically install insulation (and ancillary building products) at a construction site. BLD employs the labor, sources the material (often from its own distribution network), and guarantees the installation.

2. **Specialty Distribution:** A contractor or installer purchases insulation products from BLD's distribution centers. BLD acts as a specialty wholesale distributor — buying from manufacturers (Owens Corning, Johns Manville, Knauf) and reselling with value-added logistics, stocking, and technical support.

##### Dual-Segment Model — Value Chain Position

```
Manufacturers (OC, JM, Knauf)
        ↓
[BLD Specialty Distribution] ← supplies product
        ↓
[BLD Installation Services]  ← performs labor
        ↓
Homebuilders / Commercial Contractors (DR Horton, Lennar, PulteGroup, Turner)
        ↓
End Customer (Homeowner / Building Occupant)
```

This dual-channel model is BLD's structural differentiator vs. IBP (install-only). The distribution segment:
- Creates purchasing scale that lowers material costs for installation
- Generates standalone margin on third-party installer sales
- Provides geographic coverage in markets where installation density is insufficient

##### Revenue Model
- **Installation:** Labor + materials revenue; pricing is typically per-square-foot or per-unit based on housing type
- **Distribution:** Product markup (distribution spread) on insulation and building products sold to third parties

---

#### 3. Segment Deep Dive

##### Installation Services (~62% of FY2025 Revenue — ~$3.35B)

| Metric | Detail |
|--------|--------|
| Branch Count | ~250 nationwide |
| Product Mix | Insulation ~80%; windows, garage doors, gutters, fireplaces ~20% |
| Customer Type | Homebuilders (single-family & multi-family); commercial contractors |
| Labor Model | Company-employed installers (not subcontracted) — creates quality control advantage |
| Geographic Reach | National; present in all major construction markets |

**End Markets (Installation — estimated):**
- Residential new construction (single-family): ~55%
- Multi-family: ~10%
- Commercial new construction: ~25%
- Repair & Remodel: ~10%

**Margin Profile (Adj. EBITDA):** ~21% (segment-level), per Q3 2025 disclosure [S4]

##### Specialty Distribution (~38% of FY2025 Revenue — ~$2.05B, pre-SPI normalization ~$2.5B post-SPI)

| Metric | Detail |
|--------|--------|
| Distribution Centers | ~190 (US ~170, Canada ~20) |
| Product Mix | Insulation ~89%; accessories, building wrap, other products ~11% |
| Customer Type | Independent installers, mechanical contractors, commercial GCs |
| Post-SPI Addition | Mechanical insulation (pipes, vessels, HVAC); industrial/commercial focus |
| Geography | US + Canada (cross-border adds modest diversification) |

**End Markets (Distribution — estimated post-SPI):**
- Residential: ~40% (pre-SPI was higher)
- Commercial new construction: ~30%
- Industrial/mechanical: ~20% (SPI-driven)
- Repair & Remodel: ~10%

---

#### 4. Business History & Key Milestones

| Year | Event |
|------|-------|
| 2015 | Spun off from Masco Corporation; ~$1.9B revenue; ~$1B goodwill |
| 2017–2020 | Steady organic growth + small bolt-ons; revenue $2.3B–$3.0B |
| 2021 | Distribution International (DI) acquired for $1.0B — doubles distribution scale |
| 2021–2022 | Revenue surges to $5.0B on housing boom + material price inflation |
| 2023–2024 | Organic growth moderates; EBITDA margins peak 19.3–19.5%; buybacks accelerate |
| 2025 | SPI ($1.0B) + Progressive Roofing ($810M); 7 total acquisitions; mix shifts to commercial |

---

#### 5. Customer Concentration & Relationships

- **Top customers:** National homebuilders — D.R. Horton, Lennar, PulteGroup, NVR, Meritage
- No single customer exceeds 10% of revenue (diversified builder base)
- Relationships are multi-year service agreements; switching costs exist (logistics integration, job-site consistency)
- Commercial: General contractors, mechanical contractors; more transactional but growing stickiness via SPI

---

#### 6. Competitive Positioning

| Dimension | TopBuild (BLD) | IBP (Installed Building Products) |
|-----------|--------------|----------------------------------|
| Revenue | $5.4B | ~$2.2B |
| Model | Install + Distribute | Install only |
| Branches | ~440 total | ~240 |
| End Market | Diversified (post-SPI) | ~80% residential |
| Margin | EBITDA 17–19% | EBITDA ~14–16% |
| Geographic | National | National (some gaps) |

BLD's advantages: scale-driven purchasing power, dual-channel synergies, acquisition platform in a fragmented $20B+ market.

---

#### 7. Capital-Light Services Model

CapEx as a % of revenue: ~1.1–1.4% (FY2021–FY2025) [S5]. This is classic services/distribution economics:
- No manufacturing plants; no heavy equipment factories
- Main fixed assets: vehicles, branches (often leased), distribution center equipment
- High FCF conversion: FCF margin ~12.9–15.1% of revenue (FY2023–2025)

---

#### Source Index
- [S1] Company description from SEC 10-K FY2025; web research via StockTitan/stockanalysis.com
- [S2] SEC XBRL revenue data (CIK 0001633931); StockAnalysis annual revenue history
- [S3] TopBuild press releases: SPI October 2025 ($1.0B), Progressive Roofing July 2025 ($810M)
- [S4] Web search: Q3 2025 earnings; installation segment adjusted EBITDA margin disclosure
- [S5] XBRL CapEx data (PaymentsToAcquirePropertyPlantAndEquipment); StockAnalysis FCF data

## Financial Snapshot

---
source: coverage-next-full
ticker: BLD
company: TopBuild Corp.
step: 04
title: Financial Snapshot & Quality Analysis
created: 2026-05-27
---

### Step 04 — Financial Snapshot & Quality: TopBuild Corp. (BLD)

#### Key Findings
**Net positive — high financial quality with elevated goodwill risk.** BLD's financial reporting is clean and straightforward: GAAP earnings are of high quality (strong accrual-to-cash conversion, low non-recurring items), no restatements, and no material accounting concerns. The primary financial quality issue is the $3.05B goodwill balance (46% of total assets) accumulated through acquisitions — while not an immediate impairment risk, it creates vulnerability in a severe construction downcycle. The adversarial sweep found no significant short seller reports, class action suits, or fraud allegations.

#### Implications for Thesis and Valuation
The clean financial profile supports a premium EV/EBITDA multiple vs. peers with lower-quality earnings. The goodwill concentration is a known risk that `/complete-coverage` should scenario-test (what happens to equity value if BLD takes a 20-30% goodwill impairment?). FCF conversion is exceptionally high — the capital-light model means GAAP net income is actually understated vs. cash reality (D&A >> capex by $100M+ annually).

#### Objective
Assess the quality of TopBuild's financial statements, identify any adjustments needed for analysis, and conduct the mandatory Adversarial Research Sweep.

#### Narrative Analysis

##### Income Statement Quality

**Revenue recognition:** BLD recognizes installation revenue as services are performed (percentage of completion for installation contracts). Distribution revenue is recognized on shipment/delivery. Both are standard for the industry and consistent with ASC 606 requirements [S1].

**EBITDA adjustments:** Management reports "Adjusted EBITDA" which excludes:
- SBC (~$16-17M/year)
- Acquisition-related costs (legal, integration, transaction fees — likely $30-50M in FY2025 given two major acquisitions)
- Amortization of acquired intangibles ($50-70M/year — included in D&A but management may separate)

For analytical purposes, the reported EBITDA of $961M (FY2025) is close to "adjusted" — the incremental adjustments are relatively modest [S2].

**Earnings quality signals:**
- FCF/Net Income = $697M / $522M = **134%** — excellent; D&A ($169M) well exceeds capex ($59M), boosting cash vs. GAAP earnings
- Working capital as % of revenue has been stable — no inventory buildup, no AR manipulation concerns
- SBC of $16-17M/year is modest (0.3% of revenue) — not materially diluting GAAP earnings

##### Balance Sheet Quality

**Goodwill Analysis:**
| FY | Goodwill | % of Total Assets | Notes |
|----|---------|-------------------|-------|
| 2021 | $1,950M | 45.8% | Post-ISI acquisition |
| 2022 | $1,967M | 42.7% | Modest organic additions |
| 2023 | $2,043M | 39.5% | Tuck-in bolt-ons |
| 2024 | $2,112M | 44.6% | Bolt-on acquisitions |
| 2025 | $3,045M | **46.1%** | SPI + Progressive Roofing addition |

The goodwill jump from $2.1B (2024) to $3.0B (2025) reflects the ~$1.8B in acquisition purchase prices applied to deals where net assets were far less than purchase price. This is standard for service/distribution acquisitions (no hard assets), but creates goodwill exposure.

**Impairment scenario:** If BLD were to take a 30% impairment on goodwill ($914M), this would reduce equity by ~$914M × (1 - tax rate, ~25%) = ~$686M in after-tax equity impact, but would NOT affect cash flow. The book value of equity would decline from $2,316M to ~$1,630M — but EBITDA and FCF would be unchanged. Rating agencies and lenders covenant on EBITDA, not book equity, so the operational impact would be minimal. However, it would be a significant GAAP earnings event.

**Intangibles:** $1.35B of intangibles (primarily customer relationships and trade names acquired via acquisitions) are amortizing over 5-15 year lives. This creates a recurring amortization charge that distorts GAAP net income vs. economic reality; add-back is standard in adjusted metrics.

**Debt structure:**
- Total debt: $3.15B (FY2025) — primarily senior notes + revolving credit facility
- Interest rate: Mix of fixed-rate senior notes (~4.5-6% range) and floating-rate revolver
- Post-SPI, approximately $1.5B in new senior notes were issued in September 2025

##### Cash Flow Quality
| FY | Net Income | Operating CF | FCF | FCF/NI |
|----|-----------|-------------|-----|--------|
| 2022 | $556M | $496M | $419M | 75% |
| 2023 | $614M | $849M | $785M | 128% |
| 2024 | $623M | $776M | $707M | 114% |
| 2025 | $522M | $756M | $697M | 134% |

FY2022 FCF/NI was lower due to working capital build; FY2023+ shows excellent conversion as working capital normalized. The structural driver of FCF > NI is D&A >> Capex: in FY2025, D&A was $169M vs. Capex of $59M — a $110M non-cash item boosting cash vs. GAAP [S3].

##### Adversarial Research Sweep
*Note: Transcript analysis was not performed. This sweep is based on SEC filings, press releases, and web searches for adversarial coverage.*

**Short seller reports:** No material short reports identified. Short interest at 5.48% of float as of May 2026 — elevated vs. normal but not unusual given the pending QXO acquisition arb setup [S4].

**Class action lawsuits:** No material securities class action suits identified. BLD has routine construction-related litigation (personal injury, property damage, contract disputes) disclosed in 10-K risk factors — standard for a company with 18,000+ employees performing physical work at construction sites.

**SEC investigations:** No SEC investigations identified.

**Accounting irregularities:** No restatements in the past 10 years. Auditor changes: None flagged.

**Key 10-K risk factors of analytical note:**
- Goodwill impairment risk explicitly disclosed
- Contractor license/safety regulation compliance
- Dependence on a few major insulation manufacturers
- Integration risks from acquisitions
- Housing market cyclicality

**Overall adversarial sweep conclusion:** CLEAN — No material financial quality concerns beyond the known goodwill concentration. The financial reporting is straightforward and high quality.

#### Evidence and Sources

| Category | Finding |
|----------|---------|
| FCF/Net Income conversion | 134% (FY2025) — excellent |
| Goodwill | $3.05B = 46% of total assets |
| Short interest | 5.48% of float |
| Restatements | None |
| Class actions | None material |

#### Assumption Register Updates

| ID | Update |
|----|--------|
| A06 | Confirmed: Goodwill $3.05B, 46% of assets. Impairment scenario: 30% write-down = ~$686M after-tax equity impact |
| New | FCF conversion > 100% consistently driven by D&A >> Capex differential |

#### Tables and Calculations

##### Key Financial Quality Metrics

| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Revenue | $5,195M | $5,330M | $5,409M |
| Gross Margin | 30.9% | 30.5% | 29.0% |
| EBITDA Margin | 19.5% | 19.3% | 17.8% |
| Net Margin | 11.8% | 11.7% | 9.7% |
| FCF Margin | 15.1% | 13.3% | 12.9% |
| FCF/Net Income | 128% | 114% | 134% |
| D&A | $133M | $140M | $169M |
| Capex | $64M | $69M | $59M |
| D&A/Capex ratio | 2.1x | 2.0x | 2.9x |

##### Balance Sheet Snapshot (FY2025)

| Item | Amount | % Assets |
|------|--------|---------|
| Cash | $185M | 2.8% |
| Goodwill | $3,045M | 46.1% |
| Intangibles (ex-GW) | $1,352M | 20.5% |
| Total Assets | $6,605M | 100% |
| Total Debt | $3,151M | — |
| Shareholders' Equity | $2,316M | — |
| Net Debt | $2,966M | — |
| Net Debt/EBITDA | **3.1x** | — |

#### Open Questions and Data Gaps

1. Precise debt maturity schedule and covenant terms (revolving credit facility details)
2. Amortization of acquired intangibles vs. D&A breakdown (separation for "adjusted" metrics)
3. Working capital DSO/DPO trends by segment post-SPI
4. Tax rate guidance for 2026 (SPI integration may affect deferred tax position)

**Next-Step Dependencies:** Step 05 should track the quarterly momentum trend, particularly the margin impact of SPI and Progressive Roofing entering the income statement. Step 06 should provide full leverage analysis.

#### Source Index

| Source Tag | Document or URL | Section | Date | Notes |
|------------|----------------|---------|------|-------|
| [S1] | BLD_financials/sec_filings/filing_inventory.md | 10-K descriptions | 2026-05-27 | Revenue recognition policies |
| [S2] | BLD_financials/other/stockanalysis_summary.md | Annual financials | 2026-05-27 | EBITDA/NI/FCF |
| [S3] | BLD_financials/xbrl/xbrl_summary.md | D&A/Capex table | 2026-05-27 | $169M D&A vs. $59M capex FY2025 |
| [S4] | BLD_financials/other/stockanalysis_summary.md | Key statistics | 2026-05-27 | 5.48% short interest |

## Recent Catalysts

---
source: coverage-next-full
ticker: BLD
company: TopBuild Corp.
step: 12
title: Bull vs. Bear — Analyst Debate
created: 2026-05-27
---

### Step 12 — Bull vs. Bear: TopBuild Corp. (BLD)

*Note: Transcript analysis not performed (filings-and-consensus path). The bull/bear debate is reconstructed from consensus analyst commentary, press releases, and recent news. Management's qualitative guidance language is not available.*

#### Key Findings
**Debate is primarily about: (1) pace of residential recovery, (2) SPI integration execution, and (3) QXO deal optionality.** The analyst community is broadly constructive (12 Buy / 0 Sell ratings, avg. target $475 vs. $413 price) but the bull/bear divergence is meaningful. Bulls see the SPI/Progressive diversification as a structural re-rating catalyst + IRA/code-driven secular growth. Bears see elevated leverage, margin compression, and a housing market that may stay depressed longer than expected. The QXO deal at $505 creates a bounded range: floor at $300–350 (standalone), ceiling at $505 (deal close).

#### Implications for Thesis and Valuation
The debate resolves differently depending on time horizon. In a 6-month horizon, the QXO deal is the dominant variable — the thesis becomes merger arbitrage. In a 1–3 year standalone horizon (scenario where deal fails), the bull/bear debate on residential recovery and SPI integration is the key driver. For `/complete-coverage` valuation purposes: the standalone bull case is ~$500–550/share, the bear case is ~$280–320/share, and the mid-cycle base is ~$430–460/share — consistent with the QXO offer price as a reasonable mid-case marker.

#### Objective
Articulate the bull and bear debate as analysts would frame it; conclude with three-bullet bull and bear cases.

#### Narrative Analysis

##### The Bull Case Framework

**Core argument:** BLD is a high-quality compounder entering a recovery phase after a deliberate transformation that reduces cyclicality, expands TAM, and positions the company for $9–10B revenue by 2030 [S4].

**Bull Argument 1 — Residential recovery is underpriced.** The housing starts deficit vs. household formation is approximately 4M units since 2012 [S3]. At some point, affordability constraints ease (rate cuts, price stabilization, new supply). When starts recover to 1.5–1.6M, BLD's organic revenue growth reaccelerates by 8–12% from current levels without any acquisition contribution. This scenario isn't priced into the current EPS trajectory.

**Bull Argument 2 — SPI/Progressive transformation reduces cyclicality and expands TAM.** Pre-acquisition, BLD was ~65% residential and $5.3B revenue. Post-acquisition, BLD is ~45–50% residential and ~$6.1B revenue. The industrial/commercial mix shift provides earnings stability in the next residential downturn. SPI's data center and industrial HVAC insulation exposure is a new secular growth driver that the market hasn't fully valued.

**Bull Argument 3 — Capital allocation optionality.** Once leverage comes down to 2–2.5x (expected by FY2027 on management's track record), BLD returns to aggressive buybacks. At $413/share, buying back shares at <17x forward earnings is value-creating. The buyback optionality is not reflected in consensus earnings models.

##### The Bear Case Framework

**Core argument:** BLD has taken on significant leverage at peak acquisition multiples, acquired into a weakening market, and faces margin headwinds that could persist for 2–3 years longer than the Street models.

**Bear Argument 1 — Leverage + housing downturn = dangerous combination.** At 3.1x Net Debt/EBITDA and housing starts potentially heading lower (if mortgage rates remain elevated), BLD's ability to deleverage relies on EBITDA growing as modeled. If FY2026 EBITDA misses guidance ($1.005–1.155B), the leverage ratio stays elevated and credit markets become less accommodating. Interest expense of ~$140–160M is a structural drag on EPS that wasn't present pre-acquisitions.

**Bear Argument 2 — SPI integration risk is underestimated.** SPI is a mechanical insulation distributor serving industrial/HVAC applications — a different customer set, sales motion, and product mix than BLD's traditional residential insulation. Integrating a $700M revenue business with a different go-to-market while simultaneously integrating Progressive Roofing stretches management bandwidth. If SPI synergies materialize slower than projected, the ~13x entry multiple looks like a value-destruction deal for 3+ years.

**Bear Argument 3 — IBP is closing the gap and commoditizing pricing.** Installed Building Products continues to grow, recently acquired its own regional platforms, and is gaining share in commercial markets. If IBP reaches $3–4B revenue within 3 years, it will meaningfully close BLD's purchasing leverage advantage. The narrowing of the scale gap puts BLD's gross margin premium at risk.

##### Context: Analyst Positioning

Per consensus data (May 2026) [S2]:
- **12 Buy / 0 Sell / 0 Hold** — unusually bullish skew; may reflect QXO deal floor ($505 creates a backstop that makes Sell ratings hard to justify)
- **Average target $475.30** (+15% from $413)
- **Note:** Several analysts downgraded to Hold in May 2026 on macro uncertainty; the consensus may have ticked lower since the dataset was compiled

The unanimous Buy skew is likely anchored partly by QXO — it's hard to be bearish when there's a $505 hard bid pending. If the deal fails, analyst sentiment could shift quickly to mixed.

##### QXO Deal Scenario

Announced April 19, 2026 by QXO at $505/share cash (~$17B enterprise value) [S4]:
- **Implied multiple:** ~17.8x FY2025 EBITDA ($961M); ~15.7x FY2026E EBITDA ($1.08B)
- **Arb spread:** $505 - $413 = $92 = 22.3% gross spread
- **Expected close:** Q3 2026 (pending shareholder vote + regulatory review)
- **Strategic rationale for QXO:** QXO is led by Brad Jacobs (founder of XPO Logistics, United Rentals) — a serial acquirer applying the consolidation playbook to building products distribution

The market's ~18% discount to deal price implies either: (a) ~15–20% probability the deal fails, or (b) time value of the ~6-month wait, or (c) both.

---

#### Bull Case — 3 Bullets

1. **Residential recovery + IRA tailwinds re-accelerate organic growth.** A recovery in U.S. housing starts to 1.5M by 2027 (vs. 1.3–1.4M in 2025), combined with building energy code upgrades (IECC 2021) and IRA weatherization credits, drives 6–8% organic volume growth in the Installation segment. This scenario supports $6.5B+ revenue and $1.2B+ EBITDA in FY2027, well above current consensus.

2. **SPI/Progressive Roofing integrations deliver synergies; leverage normalizes.** Management's demonstrated integration track record (DI, 2021–2023) repeats: SPI cost synergies of $30–50M over 3 years and revenue cross-sell materialize, pulling ROIC back above 18%. Net debt falls below 2x EBITDA by FY2027, restoring capital allocation optionality (buybacks, tuck-ins) and a re-rating of the multiple from ~15x to ~18–20x.

3. **QXO deal closes at $505/share in Q3 2026.** The largest near-term catalyst: regulatory approval is straightforward (no market concentration issues in insulation services), BLD shareholders approve an ~22% premium. Investors collect $505 on a $413 entry — a fully certain, rule-of-law-driven return of ~22% in 6 months.

---

#### Bear Case — 3 Bullets

1. **Housing starts remain depressed; SPI integration disappoints.** If mortgage rates stay above 6.5% through 2026, single-family starts stay at 900K–1.1M and BLD's organic business grows at 0–2%. SPI integration costs exceed budgets as the mechanical insulation distribution model doesn't translate cleanly to BLD's residential-oriented platform. FY2026 EBITDA misses the low end of guidance ($1.0B); leverage stays at 2.7–3.0x; buybacks are suspended.

2. **QXO deal breaks; stock re-rates to standalone value.** If the deal fails (regulatory objections, QXO financing issues, or changed circumstances), BLD stock re-prices to $300–340 — the range the stock was in before the deal announcement (~$280–350). At this price, the housing-starts-dependent thesis must work without a deal backstop; with elevated leverage, a standalone BLD facing tepid organic growth could trade at 13–15x depressed earnings.

3. **IBP gains share; BLD's premium margins compress structurally.** IBP continues aggressive tuck-in acquisitions, closes the national coverage gap, and begins competing for BLD's national builder relationships on price. Within 3 years, BLD's EBIT margin compresses from 14.6% toward IBP's ~13% as pricing power erodes. Combined with higher leverage and integration costs, EPS in FY2027 stays near FY2025 levels (~$18–19) rather than recovering to $21+ as Street models assume.

#### Assumption Register Updates

| ID | Step | Assumption | Type | Value | Unit | Basis | Sensitivity | Source Tags |
|----|------|-----------|------|-------|------|-------|------------|-------------|
| A14 | 12 | Analyst consensus: 12 Buy / avg target $475.30 vs $413.35 | Fact | $475.30 | USD/share | StockAnalysis, Nasdaq May 2026 | Medium | [S2] |
| A34 | 12 | QXO deal at $505/share; expected close Q3 2026; ~20% arb spread | Fact | $505 | USD/share | Company press release Apr 2026 | High | [S4] |
| A35 | 12 | Bear case deal-break scenario: BLD re-rates to $300–340 standalone | Judgment | $300–340 | USD/share | Pre-deal trading range + leverage discount | High | — |

#### Open Questions and Data Gaps

1. **QXO deal probability:** Independent market intelligence (deal tracker services, legal analysis) would refine the probability. Currently estimated at ~80–85% from arb spread.
2. **Street models post-deal:** If QXO closes, consensus EPS models become moot. If deal breaks, consensus will revise down materially — important to know the deal-fail consensus EPS trajectory.
3. **Transcript gap:** Bull and bear arguments from actual analyst Q&A with management would sharpen the competitive dynamics, SPI synergy specifics, and housing recovery timing assumptions not available in this path.

#### Source Index

| Source Tag | Document or URL | Section | Date | Notes |
|------------|----------------|---------|------|-------|
| [S1] | BLD_financials/industry/market_overview.md | Demand drivers | 2026-05-27 | Residential cycle data |
| [S2] | BLD_financials/other/consensus.md | Analyst ratings | 2026-05-27 | Buy/sell/hold counts, targets |
| [S3] | BLD_financials/other/consensus.md | Macro context | 2026-05-27 | Housing starts, affordability |
| [S4] | BLD_financials/presentations/investor_presentation_2025.md | QXO section | 2026-05-27 | $505 deal, April 2026 announcement |
| [S5] | BLD_financials/industry/competitive_landscape.md | IBP comparison | 2026-05-27 | IBP margin/share data |

## Full Research Available

This primer covers steps 1–3 of 19. The full deep dive (moat analysis, DCF, bull/bear,
management quality, earnings transcript analysis) is available via:

- Investment memo: /memo/bld
- Full research API: GET /api/v1/research/BLD/memo
- Coverage universe: /stocks