# Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV (BUD)

**Exchange:** NYSE  
**Coverage as of:** 2026-Q2  
**Updated:** 2026-05-28  
**Report type:** Primer (steps 1–3 of 19)  
**API endpoint:** GET /api/v1/research/BUD/primer

## Business Model

---
source: coverage-next-full
ticker: BUD
step: 01
title: Business Model & Overview
generated: 2026-05-28
---

### Step 01 — Business Model & Overview

#### Key Findings

- BUD is the **world's largest brewer** by volume (~25% global share) [S9] and
  by revenue ($59.3B FY25 [S2]), with ~500 brands across ~50 countries.
- Operates as a **vertically-integrated, asset-heavy global brewer + distributor**:
  owns barley supply (in part), maltings, breweries, packaging, logistics, and
  in many EMs the direct-to-retail B2B platform (BEES) [S7].
- Profit pool concentrated in just **three economies — US, Brazil, Mexico** —
  which together contribute >60% of EBITDA [S7]. This is the central
  geographic concentration risk and opportunity.
- **Three global brands** (Budweiser, Corona, Stella Artois) anchor the
  premium portfolio; **megabrand set** (~70% of revenue) extends to Michelob
  Ultra, Modelo Mexico, Brahma, Skol, Beck's, Hoegaarden, Leffe [S7].
- Net positive for the thesis — global scale + diversified profit pool +
  vertical control + premium-portfolio compounding all genuine moat sources.

#### Implications for Thesis and Valuation

The business model has three valuation-relevant features:

1. **Operating leverage from premium mix-shift** — premium portfolio +6.3%
   revenue growth vs flat total volumes [S7]; even modest mix shifts move EBITDA.
2. **Cash generation is structural, not cyclical** — vertically-integrated +
   countercyclical beer category + low capex requirement (3.5% of revenue) →
   FCF $11.2B reliable [S4].
3. **BEES B2B platform** ($50B+ GMV [S7]) is an embedded distribution moat that
   competitors cannot easily replicate; this is the under-modeled asset in
   most sell-side decks.

#### Objective

Map BUD's business model — what they make, how they make money, how they
distribute, where the profit pool sits, and what the value-chain layers are.

#### Narrative Analysis

**What BUD does.** Brews, packages, distributes, and markets beer (and a
growing adjacent portfolio of hard seltzer, RTD cocktails, alcohol-free beer,
and ready-mixed drinks) across ~50 countries. Output: roughly 580M HL of
beer annually [S9].

**Revenue model — by structural layer:**

1. **Megabrand portfolio (~70% of revenue).** The core profit engine: Budweiser,
   Corona, Stella, Michelob Ultra, Modelo (Mexico/global ex-US — STZ owns US),
   Brahma, Skol, Beck's, Hoegaarden, Leffe [S7]. Wholesale to distributors and
   retail; premium-positioned variants carry 2-3x the EBITDA per HL of standard
   brands.
2. **Regional / local brands (~25% of revenue).** ~500 SKUs covering value
   tier in specific geographies — Aguila (Colombia), Cass (Korea), Harbin
   (China), Quilmes (Argentina). Lower margin but volume defenders.
3. **Beyond Beer (~5% of revenue, +23% growth) [S7].** Cutwater Spirits (US RTD
   cocktails — triple-digit growth), NUTRL hard seltzer, Mike's Hard Lemonade,
   Brutal Fruit (S Africa), Flying Fish, Babe Wine. Adjacency expansion;
   high-margin variable-cost adjacencies that share distribution.
4. **Alcohol-free / no-low alc (~3% of revenue, +34% growth) [S7].** Corona
   Cero, Budweiser Zero, Stella Zero, Beck's Blue. Among fastest-growing
   sub-segments globally [S10]; ~20% better unit margin than alcoholic
   counterparts per AB InBev disclosure.
5. **BEES B2B + DTC platform.** Not a separate revenue line — a distribution
   enabler. ~$50B GMV across 31 markets [S7]; in places like Brazil and Mexico
   it directly serves >2M small retailers and bars, with last-mile delivery and
   credit. Direct economic benefit: better mix, less promo waste, real-time
   demand signal. Hard to value separately but real strategic moat.

**How money is made — economics:**

- Net revenue per HL: ~$102 globally (FY25 = $59.3B / 580M HL ≈ $102/HL)
- EBITDA per HL: ~$36 (= $21.06B / 580M HL ≈ $36/HL) — premium markets >$50/HL,
  EM value markets <$25/HL [S7]
- Premium HL carry +50-80% EBITDA per HL premium vs standard
- Capex: ~$3.7B annually = 6.2% of revenue (FY25), down from 10.4% in FY21 [S4]
- Working capital: structurally negative ($-9.7B WC FY25 [S3]) — suppliers and
  distributors finance the business; this is a meaningful float advantage

**Value-chain layer map:**

| Layer                     | Owned by BUD?                            | Notes                                                  |
|---------------------------|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| Raw materials (barley/hops)| Partial — long-term supply contracts    | Some owned malting capacity                              |
| Brewing / packaging       | ✓ Fully integrated                       | ~200+ breweries globally                                 |
| Logistics                 | ✓ in EM; mixed in DM                    | Owned distribution in Brazil/Mexico; 3-tier in US        |
| Wholesale                 | Mixed — own in EM, distributor-led in US| US 3-tier system mandates independent distributors       |
| Retail / on-trade         | Partial (some bars, pubs)               | Some on-trade ownership in EU; mostly independent retail|
| DTC                       | ✓ Zé Delivery (BR), Tada (LatAm)       | Direct-to-consumer in select EM markets                  |
| B2B platform              | ✓ BEES                                   | Cuts out distributor sales reps; direct-to-bar           |

#### Evidence and Sources

- Revenue $59.32B FY25, EBITDA $21.06B [S2][S7]
- Volume base ~580M HL (industry estimates triangulated with IWSR + 20-F MD&A) [S9]
- Segment mix: Middle Americas 29%, NA 24%, SA 20%, EMEA 16%, APAC 10% [S7]
- Premium portfolio ~35% of revenue, +6.3% growth [S7]
- Beyond Beer +23%, alcohol-free +34% [S7]
- BEES GMV ~$50B [S7]
- ~144,000 employees [S7]

#### Assumption Register Updates

- A03 — Premium portfolio ~35% of revenue (Estimate, Med sensitivity) [S7]
- A04 — Volume base ~580M HL (Estimate, Low sensitivity) [S7][S9]
- A05 — Megabrand revenue concentration ~70% (Fact, Low sensitivity) [S7]

#### Tables and Calculations

##### Revenue mix by segment (FY25)

| Segment              | Rev share | Approx revenue ($B) | EBITDA share (est) |
|----------------------|-----------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Middle Americas      | 29%       | 17.2                 | ~32%                |
| North America        | 24%       | 14.2                 | ~24%                |
| South America        | 20%       | 11.9                 | ~16%                |
| EMEA                 | 16%       | 9.5                  | ~14%                |
| Asia Pacific         | 10%       | 5.9                  | ~13%                |
| Global Export & Hldg | 1%        | 0.6                  | ~1%                 |

##### Revenue mix by brand-tier (FY25)

| Tier                       | Rev share | YoY growth | Margin profile        |
|----------------------------|-----------|-------------|------------------------|
| Premium + super-premium    | ~35%      | +6.3%      | High (>$50/HL EBITDA) |
| Core / classic megabrands  | ~50%      | -1% to +1% | Medium ($30-40/HL)     |
| Value / local brands       | ~7-8%     | flat       | Low ($15-25/HL)        |
| Beyond Beer                | ~5%       | +23%       | High variable margin   |
| Alcohol-free / no-low alc  | ~3%       | +34%       | +20% vs alcoholic      |

##### Per-unit economics (FY25 estimates)

| Metric          | Value      |
|------------------|-----------|
| Revenue per HL  | ~$102      |
| EBITDA per HL   | ~$36       |
| Capex per HL    | ~$6.3      |
| FCF per HL      | ~$19       |

#### Open Questions and Data Gaps

- BEES profit contribution not separately disclosed — treated as distribution
  enabler. Value-as-platform argument is qualitative.
- Volume HL estimates triangulated; precise volume is not in standardized
  IFRS statements.

#### Source Index

| Tag    | Document or URL                                                      | Section | Date        | Notes                                                   |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| [S2]   | StockAnalysis.com — BUD financials                                   | full    | 2026-05-28  | BUD_financials/other/stockanalysis_summary.md           |
| [S3]   | StockAnalysis.com — BUD balance sheet                                 | full    | 2026-05-28  | BUD_financials/xbrl/xbrl_summary.md                     |
| [S4]   | StockAnalysis.com — BUD cash flow                                     | full    | 2026-05-28  | BUD_financials/xbrl/xbrl_summary.md                     |
| [S7]   | AB InBev FY2025 6-K press release / investor presentation             | full    | 2026-02-11  | BUD_financials/presentations/investor_presentation_2025.md |
| [S9]   | IWSR 2025 global beer outlook                                         | full    | 2026-05-28  | BUD_financials/industry/market_overview.md              |
| [S10]  | BeverageDaily — alcohol-free growth                                   | full    | 2026-05-28  | BUD_financials/industry/market_overview.md              |

## Financial Snapshot

---
source: coverage-next-full
ticker: BUD
step: 04
title: Financial Snapshot & Quality (with Adversarial Sweep)
generated: 2026-05-28
---

### Step 04 — Financial Snapshot & Quality

#### Key Findings

- **Cash-generation quality is high.** FCF $11.2B FY25 [S4], FCF margin 18.9%,
  FCF/EBITDA conversion 53.3%. Working capital structurally negative ($-9.7B)
  is a real economic advantage [S3].
- **Accounting quality is clean** for a $59B FPI. No financial restatements,
  no material auditor changes, Big-4 audited (PwC), unqualified opinions on
  the 20-F. Two areas of accounting judgment: goodwill impairment testing
  ($117.9B goodwill, 54% of assets [S3]) and Brazilian/Argentine
  hyperinflationary accounting (IAS 29).
- **No active short reports or major SEC/DOJ enforcement actions.** Litigation
  inventory is ordinary-course (tax cases in Brazil, antitrust historical
  matters, product liability) — material but no single case is thesis-shifting.
- **2023 Bud Light controversy was a reputational + sales event, not an
  accounting event.** Mgmt did not disclose any accounting irregularities;
  goodwill review held. SEC did not open an investigation.
- Net positive — quality of earnings is solid; the principal accounting watch
  items are goodwill / intangibles ($160B combined) and inflationary segments.

#### Implications for Thesis and Valuation

- FCF is reliable for both valuation (DCF anchor) and capital return funding.
- Goodwill = $117.9B; if a future impairment occurs (most likely candidate:
  US business if Bud Light brand value is materially written down), it would
  be a non-cash hit to reported income but not to FCF or cash position.
- Working capital structurally negative is durable — it's a function of beer
  distribution economics (rapid inventory turn + distributor float).

#### Objective

Assess the quality of BUD's reported financials: earnings quality, balance-sheet
integrity, accounting choices, auditor relationship, and any adversarial signal
(short reports, investigations, lawsuits) that could undermine the thesis.

#### Narrative Analysis

**Quality-of-earnings overview.** BUD's financial profile is high-quality for
a $59B consumer staples company:

- **Cash conversion:** OCF $14.9B vs EBITDA $21.1B = ~71% — below the high end
  for staples (typically 80-90%) but explained by net interest of ~$4.5B and
  working capital seasonality. **FCF $11.2B / EBITDA $21.1B = 53%** is the more
  conservative read [S4].
- **Quality of revenue:** standard beer-wholesale revenue recognition under
  IFRS 15 — recognized at delivery to distributor. No estimates / accruals /
  long-tail recognition issues.
- **Working capital:** structurally negative because distributors pay in
  advance via standing programs, and inventory turns 5-6x annually [S6]. Days
  payable >> days receivable.

**Balance sheet composition (FY25 [S3]):**

- Goodwill $117.9B (54% of assets) — almost all from SABMiller transaction
  (2016)
- Other intangibles $42.0B (19%) — brand portfolios, distribution rights,
  customer lists
- PP&E + other operating assets ~$45B (21%)
- Cash + current assets ~$25B (11%)

**Goodwill impairment review.** The single largest accounting judgment.
Management reviews annually. No impairment recorded FY21-FY25 despite
significant US business volume hit in 2023. The argument is that:
- Aggregate US CGU includes Michelob Ultra (gaining share), Modelo Mexico-ex-US
  (BUD owns rest of world), and other brands — so the test passes at CGU level.
- Bud Light brand line item is part of US intangibles; specific brand
  impairment was not disclosed but the auditor signed off.
- Future risk: if Bud Light volumes decline further or recovery stalls, a
  brand-specific intangible impairment could appear (estimated US business
  intangible carrying value $30-40B).

**Hyperinflationary accounting (Argentina, IAS 29).** Argentina's economy is
classified hyperinflationary. BUD restates Argentine operations and recognizes
inflation gains/losses; this introduces volatility but is standard IFRS treatment.

**Auditor:** PricewaterhouseCoopers Réviseurs d'Entreprises since 2002. No
auditor changes; unqualified opinions [S1 — public filings].

**Tax:** Belgium 25% statutory; effective tax rate FY25 ~20% blended (incl.
Ambev/Brazil higher rate). Ambev minority interest (38% of LatAm earnings)
is shown in minority interest line.

##### Adversarial Research Sweep

| Category                          | Status (FY24-FY26)                                                                                                                                                            |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Short reports / activist letters  | **None identified** for BUD specifically (May 2026 sweep). No Muddy Waters / Hindenburg / Kerrisdale report on BUD found.                                                    |
| SEC enforcement                   | **None active.** SEC has not opened any investigation tied to Bud Light controversy.                                                                                          |
| DOJ / antitrust                   | Historical — 2013 BUD/Modelo distribution deal required Constellation US-rights divestiture (settled). No active US antitrust matter.                                         |
| Material litigation               | Ongoing tax disputes (Brazil, ~$1-2B aggregate disputed); product liability claims ordinary course; one antitrust class action in EU (settled 2023 for €4-5M).                |
| Whistleblower / fraud allegations | None identified.                                                                                                                                                              |
| FCPA / compliance                 | Historical 2022 SABMiller-legacy compliance settlement in India (~$5M); no active matters.                                                                                    |
| Going-concern / loan-covenant     | No covenant breaches; ~$10-15B undrawn revolving credit; strong investment-grade ratings (A3/A-) [S5].                                                                         |
| Auditor changes / non-clean opinion| None. PwC unqualified opinions through FY25.                                                                                                                                  |
| Bud Light controversy legal       | A handful of consumer / brand-licensing class actions filed in 2023-24; none material to financial outcome.                                                                  |

**Adversarial verdict: clean.** No active short thesis, no enforcement matters,
no whistleblower issues. The principal "adversarial" issue is reputational
(Bud Light brand), which is operational/marketing, not accounting.

#### Evidence and Sources

- FCF $11.2B / OCF $14.9B [S4]
- Working capital -$9.7B [S3]
- Goodwill + intangibles $159.9B (73% of assets) [S3]
- ND/EBITDA 2.87x [S14]
- Effective tax rate ~20% [S2 derived]
- Auditor PwC since 2002 [S1 — public filings]

#### Assumption Register Updates

- A13 — FCF conversion ~50-55% of EBITDA durable (Estimate, Med sens) [S4]
- A14 — No goodwill impairment in base case (Judgment, High sens) [S3]

#### Tables and Calculations

##### Quality-of-earnings scorecard

| Metric                         | FY25 value | Industry-staple benchmark | BUD relative |
|--------------------------------|------------|----------------------------|---------------|
| OCF / Net income               | 2.18x      | 1.5-2.0x                   | ✓ Above       |
| FCF / EBITDA                   | 53%        | 50-65%                     | ✓ In range    |
| Accrual ratio (CFO-NI)/Assets  | -0.4%      | ±5%                        | ✓ Low/clean   |
| Working capital % rev          | -16%       | typically positive          | ✓ Float adv   |
| CapEx / D&A                    | 0.65x      | ~1x                        | ⚠ Below — under-investing or efficiency? |
| Goodwill / Assets              | 54%        | high if M&A-heavy           | ⚠ Watch       |

##### Adversarial signal scorecard

| Signal type                    | Risk level | Notes                                                |
|--------------------------------|------------|------------------------------------------------------|
| Short interest                 | Very low   | <1% short ratio on ADRs                              |
| SEC / regulatory investigation | None       | n/a                                                  |
| Material litigation            | Moderate   | Brazilian tax cases ongoing — sized but disclosed    |
| FCPA / compliance              | Low        | Historical SABMiller-legacy matters settled          |
| Brand reputation               | Moderate   | Bud Light story is contained but lingers in US       |

#### Open Questions and Data Gaps

- Whether the CapEx/D&A < 1 over multiple years signals genuine efficiency
  or under-investment that will catch up in maintenance capex 2027+.
- Specific Bud Light brand carrying value — not separately disclosed within
  US CGU.
- Brazilian tax dispute resolution timeline — Ambev disclosures show range
  but timing is uncertain.

#### Source Index

| Tag    | Document / URL                                                | Section | Date        | Notes                                                  |
|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| [S1]   | SEC EDGAR — BUD 20-F filings                                  | full    | 2026-05-28  | BUD_financials/sec_filings/                            |
| [S2]   | StockAnalysis.com — BUD financials                            | full    | 2026-05-28  | BUD_financials/other/stockanalysis_summary.md          |
| [S3]   | StockAnalysis.com — BUD balance sheet                          | full    | 2026-05-28  | BUD_financials/xbrl/xbrl_summary.md                    |
| [S4]   | StockAnalysis.com — BUD cash flow                              | full    | 2026-05-28  | BUD_financials/xbrl/xbrl_summary.md                    |
| [S5]   | StockAnalysis.com — BUD statistics                             | full    | 2026-05-28  | BUD_financials/other/stockanalysis_summary.md          |
| [S6]   | StockAnalysis.com — BUD ratios (inventory turnover etc.)       | full    | 2026-05-28  | BUD_financials/other/stockanalysis_summary.md          |
| [S14]  | StockTitan — AB InBev 2025 results                              | full    | 2026-02-11  | BUD_financials/sec_filings/20F_FY2025_summary.md       |

## Recent Catalysts

---
source: coverage-next-full
ticker: BUD
step: 12
title: Bull / Bear — Catalyst Debate
generated: 2026-05-28
---

### Step 12 — Bull / Bear — Catalyst Debate

#### Key Findings

- The debate over BUD is now structured as **"recovery + capital return
  inflection"** (bulls) vs **"structural beer-volume decline + Bud Light brand
  impairment"** (bears). The variance is meaningful but narrowing — Street is
  ~75% buy [S12].
- **Recovery thesis dominates near-term Street narrative** following Q1-26
  +12% revenue print + the $6B buyback + ND/EBITDA <3x milestone.
- **Bear case has not gone away** — Bud Light volumes remain materially below
  pre-2023 levels (~30% down vs 2022 peak per industry sources [S8]); category
  volumes still falling.
- Catalysts to watch: (1) Q2-26 6-K (Jul/Aug) — confirms US Michelob Ultra
  share, (2) $6B buyback progress, (3) any segment-level US recovery data.

#### Implications for Thesis and Valuation

This step is critical input to /complete-coverage Step_15 (scenarios) and the
public /stocks page Bull/Bear panels. The decision on this debate determines
the entire valuation framing.

#### Objective

Steelman both the bull and bear cases using the analyst-debate framework
adapted for the no-transcripts path. **Methodology note:** since earnings
call transcripts are not loaded in /coverage-next-full, this step uses (a)
20-F MD&A, (b) FY25 6-K press release [S7], (c) trade-press synthesis [S8][S13],
(d) sell-side consensus reports [S12], and (e) news flow [S10].

#### Narrative Analysis

##### THE BULL CASE — Recovery + Capital Return Inflection

**Core argument:** BUD has crossed the ND/EBITDA 3.0x threshold, the worst of
the Bud Light disruption is behind, premium portfolio compounds at +6%, and
the $6B buyback authorization signals management's conviction in cash-flow
runway. The stock should re-rate toward a "post-deleveraging high-FCF compounder"
multiple, similar to Coca-Cola / Diageo (15-16x EV/EBITDA vs BUD at 12x).

**Key supports:**

1. **Capital return inflection is real and observable.** Buyback FY23 $362M →
   FY25 $2,301M → $6B new authorization [S14]. Dividend +22% FY24 + 15% FY25.
   Total shareholder yield approaching 5% at current price.

2. **Underlying business is healthier than the headline.** Organic revenue
   +3.1% / organic EBITDA +4.5% in FY25 [S7]. 65% of markets growing revenue;
   75% growing EBITDA. The "premium portfolio +6.3%" growth is the real
   compounding engine, not aggregate volume.

3. **US recovery underway.** Michelob Ultra is now the #1 US beer by dollar
   share in selected weeks [S7]. The Bud Light decline rate is decelerating;
   the brand is no longer in free-fall. Net US revenue is recovering even as
   Bud Light specifically remains weak. BUD has demonstrated that its portfolio
   moat (multiple brands) can withstand single-brand impairment.

4. **Beyond Beer + alcohol-free are real growth engines.** Cutwater triple-
   digit growth; Corona Cero +34%; alcohol-free category +8% globally; BUD
   gaining ground vs Heineken's first-mover lead [S7][S10]. These adjacencies
   are high-margin and increase BUD's category share-of-throat.

5. **BEES B2B platform is structurally undervalued.** ~$50B GMV [S7] running
   through 31 markets; this is a logistics/data moat that would be worth
   ~$5-10B as a standalone tech asset. Today it's bundled into "AB InBev
   distribution" and gets no separate credit.

6. **Multiple expansion case.** BUD at 12x EV/EBITDA vs Heineken 11.5x, KO
   ~22x, Diageo ~16x. As deleveraging finishes (~FY28), BUD should converge
   toward the Diageo/KO range, implying ~15x = +25% upside on multiple alone.

##### THE BEAR CASE — Structural Volume Decline + Brand Impairment

**Core argument:** Beer is a structurally declining category in mature markets;
BUD's Bud Light brand is permanently impaired and may never reach pre-2023
share; premium mix-shift will eventually cap; debt remains massive ($73B
gross); the founder block forecloses LBO/breakup optionality.

**Key supports:**

1. **Industry volume decline is structural, not cyclical.** Global beer
   -1% volume in 2025 per IWSR [S9]; mature markets flat-to-declining. Gen Z
   drinks less; GLP-1s reduce alcohol consumption; cannabis displaces beer
   in US states. Premium mix-shift can offset for a while but math eventually
   constrains it: premium share already at 35%, ceiling is probably 45-50%.

2. **Bud Light brand impairment may be permanent.** Some ex-AB Inbev execs
   have publicly stated Bud Light hasn't recovered [S8]. Bud Light volumes
   remain ~30% below 2022 peak per industry sources [S8]. The Modelo Especial
   (now Mich Ultra) US #1 position represents a permanent rebalancing in the
   brand portfolio, with associated marketing-cost inefficiency.

3. **$61B net debt is still huge.** ND/EBITDA 2.87x is "below 3x" but is
   still high in absolute terms; interest cost ~$4.5B/yr; sensitivity to
   rate moves real. The "deleveraging completed" celebration assumes target
   ~2.0x, but mgmt has explicitly said this is "optimal", not "required" —
   capital return acceleration could pause if EBITDA growth disappoints.

4. **Founder block forecloses optionality.** Stichting AK extension to 2034
   [S11] eliminates the activist + LBO premium that otherwise might be embedded
   in valuation. The maximum-extraction breakup case (e.g., selling US
   operations to Constellation; selling Ambev minority to local Brazilian
   buyers) is structurally impossible.

5. **APAC weakness is uncertain.** China consumer slowdown is real;
   government stimulus has been incremental; mgmt has not put a recovery
   timeline on the table. APAC ~10% of revenue but disproportionately profitable
   in premium positions.

6. **Multiple compression risk.** If volume decline accelerates (especially
   if Bud Light deteriorates further), BUD could compress toward Molson Coors
   multiples (7-8x EV/EBITDA), representing ~35-40% downside.

##### Synthesizing the debate

The bull case is **more correlated to observable data** (deleveraging
milestone, $6B buyback, Q1-26 +12% revenue) and **less reliant on assumptions
about category structure**.

The bear case is **more reliant on long-tail structural arguments** that may
or may not materialize over the forecast horizon. Bud Light brand-recovery is
a real uncertainty but is largely priced — BUD trades at a discount to KO/
Diageo despite better deleveraging profile.

Consensus: **75% buy / 17% hold / 0% sell** [S12]. Average PT $89.90 vs
$82.69 spot = ~9% upside [S12]. The Street is structurally bullish but the
debate is alive.

The /complete-coverage Step_15 scenarios should weight Bull / Base / Bear
roughly **40% / 40% / 20%** to reflect this debate.

#### Evidence and Sources

- ND/EBITDA 2.87x [S14]
- $6B buyback [S14]
- Organic revenue +3.1% FY25 / +12% Q1-26 [S7][S2]
- Premium +6.3% [S7]; Beyond Beer +23%; alcohol-free +34% [S7]
- Bud Light volumes still ~30% down vs 2022 [S8]
- Founder block extended to 2034 [S11]
- Street ratings 10 buy / 2 hold / 0 sell [S12]
- Industry volumes -1% [S9]

#### Assumption Register Updates

- A32 — Bull case organic rev growth FY26-28 = +3.5 to +4.5% (Estimate, High sens) [S7][S12]
- A33 — Bear case organic rev growth FY26-28 = +1.0 to +2.0% (Estimate, High sens) [S9]
- A34 — Bull/Base/Bear weighting for Step 15 = 40/40/20 (Judgment, Med sens) [S12]

#### Tables and Calculations

##### Bull/Bear scoreboard

| Dimension                | Bull view                                       | Bear view                                              |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| FY26-28 organic rev      | +3.5-4.5%                                       | +1-2%                                                  |
| FY28 ND/EBITDA           | ~2.0x; full mgmt-target                          | ~2.5x; mgmt walks back target                          |
| US Bud Light             | Recovery to ~70% of peak by FY28                 | Permanent ~50% of peak; portfolio mix-shift absorbs    |
| EBITDA margin trajectory | 35.5% → 37.5%                                    | 35.5% → 34%                                            |
| Multiple                 | 14-15x EV/EBITDA                                  | 9-10x EV/EBITDA                                        |
| FY28 implied stock price | $115-130                                          | $55-65                                                 |

##### Catalyst calendar (next 12 months)

| Date            | Catalyst                                                   | Bull/Bear lean |
|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|
| Q2-26 6-K (Jul/Aug 2026) | H1 results — confirms US recovery + premium trajectory | Bull           |
| FY26 6-K (Feb 2027) | Full-year confirm; ND/EBITDA progress; FY27 guidance     | Either         |
| Buyback execution pace  | $6B authorization progress (announced H2 2025)            | Bull           |
| US 2026 summer selling season | Bud Light + Michelob Ultra share movements           | Either         |
| Q3-26 China APAC reads | China consumer recovery / trough confirmation              | Either         |
| Brazilian tax case progress | Settlement / ruling on disputed tax positions          | Either         |

#### Open Questions and Data Gaps

- Without transcripts, can't gauge mgmt tone on FY26 organic growth guidance
  ranges.
- Bud Light SKU-level Circana data not directly accessible to this research.

#### Next-Step Dependencies

- /complete-coverage Step_13 will use the Bull/Base/Bear inputs for forecast
- Step_14 will value the scenarios
- Step_15 will produce probability-weighted target with the 40/40/20 weighting
- Public /stocks page will surface the 3-bullet Bull and Bear cases below

#### Source Index

| Tag    | Document / URL                                            | Section | Date        | Notes                                                  |
|--------|------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| [S2]   | StockAnalysis.com — BUD financials                          | full    | 2026-05-28  | BUD_financials/other/stockanalysis_summary.md          |
| [S7]   | AB InBev FY25 6-K + investor presentation                   | full    | 2026-02-11  | BUD_financials/presentations/investor_presentation_2025.md |
| [S8]   | The Hill / CNN / Fox Business — Bud Light Mulvaney coverage  | full    | 2026-05-28  | BUD_financials/sec_filings/20F_FY2023_summary.md       |
| [S9]   | IWSR 2025 global beer outlook                                | summary | 2026-05-28  | BUD_financials/industry/market_overview.md             |
| [S10]  | BeverageDaily — alcohol-free + premium growth                | summary | 2026-05-28  | BUD_financials/industry/market_overview.md             |
| [S11]  | SC 13D/A — Stichting AK shareholder pact to 2034              | full    | 2026-03     | BUD_financials/proxy/insider_transactions.md           |
| [S12]  | Yahoo Finance / StockAnalysis — BUD analyst consensus         | full    | 2026-05-28  | BUD_financials/other/consensus.md                      |
| [S14]  | StockTitan — AB InBev FY25 results                            | full    | 2026-02-11  | BUD_financials/sec_filings/20F_FY2025_summary.md       |

---

#### Bull Case — 3 bullets

- **Capital return inflection unlocked.** ND/EBITDA crossed below 3.0x for the
  first time since the 2016 SABMiller deal (now 2.87x); $6B new buyback program
  underway + progressive +15% dividend; total shareholder yield ~5% with ~$15B
  further deleveraging headroom before mgmt's ~2.0x target.
- **Premium portfolio compounds while volume is flat.** Premium + super-premium
  +6.3% revenue growth, Beyond Beer +23%, alcohol-free +34% — mix-shift drives
  organic EBITDA +4.5% even with global beer volumes -1%; Q1-26 reported
  revenue inflected to +12.0% confirming the recovery is real.
- **US "worst is past" + BEES optionality.** Michelob Ultra captured #1 US
  beer dollar-share in selected 2025 weeks, demonstrating portfolio moat
  intact; BEES B2B platform at $50B GMV across 31 markets is a structurally
  undervalued distribution moat the Street largely ignores.

#### Bear Case — 3 bullets

- **Bud Light brand may be permanently impaired.** Volumes still ~30% below
  2022 peak nearly 3 years post-controversy; Modelo Especial took #1 US beer
  status in 2023 and never gave it back; some ex-execs publicly state recovery
  has stalled; if Bud Light deteriorates further, US intangibles ($30-40B
  carrying value) face impairment risk.
- **Structural category decline + GLP-1/wellness headwind.** Global beer
  volumes -1%/yr structural; mature markets flat-to-declining; premium mix-
  shift has a ceiling (~45-50% of revenue) before it taps out; Gen Z drinks
  less, RTD cocktails and cannabis substitute, GLP-1s reduce alcohol
  consumption — these are durable headwinds the model cannot reverse.
- **$73B debt + founder block cap optionality.** Gross debt remains huge with
  $4.5B/yr interest expense; refinancing rates partially offset; meanwhile the
  Stichting AK founder voting block extension to 2034 eliminates activist/LBO/
  breakup optionality that might otherwise support multiple expansion; the
  stock has to earn its return via execution alone.

## Full Research Available

This primer covers steps 1–3 of 19. The full deep dive (moat analysis, DCF, bull/bear,
management quality, earnings transcript analysis) is available via:

- Investment memo: /memo/bud
- Full research API: GET /api/v1/research/BUD/memo
- Coverage universe: /stocks