# FMC Corporation (FMC) — Financial Analysis

**Exchange:** NYSE  
**Coverage as of:** 2026-Q2  
**Updated:** 2026-05-29  
**Tier:** Free primer (step 2 of 19)  
**Sibling pages:** /stocks/FMC/thesis · /stocks/FMC/memo

## Financial Snapshot

---
source: coverage-next-full
ticker: FMC
step: "04"
title: Financial Snapshot — 3-Year P&L Analysis
created: 2026-05-29
---

### Step 04: Financial Snapshot — 3-Year P&L Analysis

#### Income Statement Summary

| Metric | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | Commentary |
|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------|
| Revenue | $5,045M | $5,807M | $4,161M | Peak → destocking collapse |
| Gross Profit | $1,980M | $2,172M | $1,330M | |
| Gross Margin | 39.2% | 37.4% | 32.0% | Significant margin compression |
| Adj. EBITDA | ~$1,175M | ~$1,335M | ~$858M | ~36% decline from peak |
| Adj. EBITDA Margin | 23.3% | 23.0% | 20.6% | |
| Adj. EBIT | ~$960M | ~$1,085M | ~$630M | |
| D&A | ~$215M | ~$250M | ~$228M | High from acquisition intangibles |
| Interest Expense | ~$135M | ~$160M | ~$185M | Rising with rates + high debt |
| Adj. Net Income | ~$680M | ~$740M | ~$330M | Massive drop |
| Diluted EPS (Adj.) | ~$5.30 | ~$5.78 | ~$2.65 | Half the peak |
| Free Cash Flow | ~$550M | ~$450M | ~$100M | Working capital consumed FCF |
| Shares Diluted | ~127M | ~127M | ~126M | Minimal change |

*Note: All figures are approximate based on reported/adjusted financials. FMC uses "adjusted" metrics excluding amortization of acquisition intangibles (~$200M/year), restructuring, and discontinued operations.*

#### Revenue Decline Analysis — FY2022 to FY2023 Bridge

The $1,646M revenue decline (-28.4%) can be decomposed:

| Factor | Estimated Impact | Commentary |
|--------|-----------------|-----------|
| Volume decline | ~$(1,100M) | Primary factor — channel destocking |
| Price/Mix decline | ~$(400M) | Rynaxypyr generic pressure + defensively lower pricing |
| FX headwinds | ~$(146M) | USD strength vs. BRL, EUR |
| **Total** | **~$(1,646M)** | |

The volume decline reflects almost entirely channel inventory reduction (not farmer demand destruction). Farmer usage of diamide insecticides did not fall 28% — distributors simply stopped ordering as they worked down their own inventory.

#### Margin Analysis

##### Gross Margin Compression (39.2% → 32.0%)
The 720bps gross margin decline over two years reflects:
1. **Volume deleverage**: Fixed manufacturing costs spread over lower volumes
2. **Price erosion**: Rynaxypyr pricing under pressure from generic alternatives
3. **Mix shift**: Lower-value destocked products (older chemistry) moved more; higher-margin diamide moved less
4. **Input cost timing**: Some raw material cost headwinds in 2022 fed through to 2023 COGS

FMC's gross margin at normalized volumes and pricing should recover toward 36–39% — the core chemistry is inherently high-gross-margin. Manufacturing is largely outsourced (FMC is an asset-light formulator/marketer), limiting fixed cost drag.

##### EBITDA Margin Compression (23.0% → 20.6%)
- SG&A as % of sales increased significantly (relatively fixed cost base vs. lower revenue)
- R&D maintained (~8% of sales) despite revenue decline — FMC protected the innovation pipeline
- EBITDA margin at normalized $5B+ revenue should recover to 24–27% per analyst consensus

##### Free Cash Flow — The Critical Problem
FMC's FCF deteriorated dramatically:
- FY2021: ~$550M
- FY2022: ~$450M (lower despite higher EBITDA — AR buildup from extended LatAm terms)
- FY2023: ~$100M (EBITDA collapsed + significant working capital build)

**Why FCF lagged EBITDA so severely:**
- **Accounts receivable**: Brazil distribution involves 90–180 day payment terms. As revenue declined, FMC collected prior-year AR but also built new AR on extended terms.
- **Inventory**: FMC had to work down its own inventory as orders collapsed
- **The compounding**: In the downturn, FMC shipped less (hurting AR collection) while still carrying production costs

**Working capital normalization** (AR collection + inventory reduction) is a primary source of cash generation in the recovery. FMC guided for $400–600M FCF improvement from working capital alone as the cycle normalizes.

#### Adjusted EPS Trend

| Year | Adj. EPS | YoY Change |
|------|----------|-----------|
| FY2020 | ~$4.52 | |
| FY2021 | ~$5.30 | +17% |
| FY2022 | ~$5.78 | +9% |
| FY2023 | ~$2.65 | -54% |
| FY2024E | ~$3.00–3.50 | +13–32% |
| FY2025E | ~$4.50–5.50 | Recovery |

The trajectory reflects the severity of the 2023 earnings collapse. At $5.78 peak EPS and ~$2.65 trough, FMC experienced the deepest EPS decline among major ag input companies in 2023. The recovery path back to prior peak EPS ($5.50–6.00) likely requires FY2026+ given Rynaxypyr headwinds.

#### Cost Structure Analysis

FMC's cost structure is approximately:
- **COGS** (excl. amortization): ~60–65% of revenue at trough, 58–62% at normal
  - Raw materials/technical ingredients: ~35–40% of sales
  - Tolling/contract manufacturing: ~10–15%
  - Logistics/freight: ~8–10%
- **R&D**: ~7–9% of sales ($320–360M/year); protected through cycle
- **SG&A**: ~12–15% of sales (somewhat fixed; deleverage in downturn)
- **Amortization of intangibles**: ~$200M/year (non-cash; large from DuPont acquisition)

**Asset-light model**: FMC owns limited manufacturing — it primarily sources active ingredients (technical concentrates) from third-party manufacturers (many in China and India), then formulates and packages in regional facilities. This limits capex (~$80–120M/year, ~2% of sales) but creates supply chain risk.

#### Key Financial Ratios (FY2023)

| Ratio | Value | Commentary |
|-------|-------|-----------|
| Gross Margin | 32.0% | Below normalized 37–39% |
| EBITDA Margin | 20.6% | Below normalized 23–26% |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | ~3.8x | Elevated; concern for credit |
| Interest Coverage | ~3.4x | Thin at trough |
| FCF Conversion | ~12% (of EBITDA) | Very poor; working capital consumed |
| ROIC (adj.) | ~8–9% | Below WACC at trough |
| Dividend Payout (FCF) | >100% | FCF barely covered dividend in 2023 |

#### Balance Sheet Snapshot (YE 2023)

| Item | Amount |
|------|--------|
| Cash & Equivalents | ~$200M |
| Accounts Receivable | ~$1,100M |
| Inventory | ~$700M |
| Goodwill + Intangibles | ~$3,200M |
| Total Assets | ~$7,200M |
| Total Debt (gross) | ~$3,400M |
| Net Debt | ~$3,200M |
| Shareholders' Equity | ~$2,600M |
| Net Debt / Equity | ~1.2x |

The goodwill/intangibles balance ($3.2B) primarily reflects the 2017 DuPont Crop Protection acquisition premium. As Rynaxypyr (a key acquired asset) faces generic pressure, there is a non-zero risk of impairment testing scrutiny, though FMC has not disclosed any impairment flags to date.

#### Forward-Looking Considerations

**Revenue recovery scenario:**
- Base case: Revenue recovers to ~$4.8–5.2B by FY2025 as destocking ends and new products ramp
- Bull case: $5.2–5.5B on faster Isoflex/Cyazypyr traction and favorable ag commodity pricing
- Bear case: ~$4.2–4.5B if Rynaxypyr erosion exceeds new product gains

**Margin recovery scenario:**
- Base case: EBITDA margin returns to ~23–25% on volume recovery and pricing stabilization
- At $5.0B revenue × 24% EBITDA margin = $1.2B EBITDA (close to prior peak)
- FCF recovery to $500–700M as working capital normalizes

## Deeper Financial Analysis

The fundamental tier ($1.00) adds 8 dimensions not included here:

- Revenue Breakdown — segment revenue, geographic mix, product-line margins
- Financial Trends — QoQ momentum, leading indicators, inflection points
- Balance Sheet — debt structure, dilution risk, working capital dynamics
- Capital Allocation — ROIC, buyback cadence, reinvestment efficiency
- Earnings Analysis — beats/misses, guidance vs actuals, transcript highlights
- Competitive Positioning — market share, pricing power, peer benchmarks
- Industry Context — TAM, sector tailwinds/headwinds, regulatory backdrop

**API endpoint:** GET /api/v1/research/FMC/fundamental

## Navigation

- Overview: /stocks/FMC
- Financials (this page): /stocks/FMC/financials
- Thesis: /stocks/FMC/thesis
- Investment Memo: /stocks/FMC/memo
- Coverage universe: /stocks